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Contracting for Confidential 
Discovery 
Seth Katsuya Endo* 
One way that courts have adapted to the age of the internet is to provide 
nearly instant online access to their dockets. But many important filings 
remain shielded from public view as courts regularly issue stipulated 
protective orders at the request of the parties. And, while the costs and 
benefits of confidential discovery have been extensively discussed in the 
academic literature, several important contextual developments — 
including the continuing growth of electronically stored information — 
prompt a reexamination. Additionally, easily searchable federal dockets 
now provide a window into what is happening in actual practice. 
Taking up this task, Contracting for Confidential Discovery examines 
how federal trial courts dealt with 100 proposed stipulated protective orders 
in January 2018. A key finding is that courts are regularly entering orders 
overly favoring secrecy in a manner that is inconsistent with the governing 
jurisprudence and consensus theory. The Article proposes several doctrinal 
and policy interventions to rectify the most problematic common mistakes: 
(1) an overreliance on boilerplate language and (2) the conflation of the 
relatively low standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential with the 
much higher bar for filing materials under seal.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the digital era, it is easy to feel constantly bombarded by 
information.1 Even so, what remains hidden can be surprising. Despite 
our seemingly exhaustive access to court records through online 
databases, private confidentiality agreements between parties are 
regularly entered by courts as stipulated protective orders, shielding 
litigation materials from public view. The common use of stipulated 
protective orders might be unexpected because, from popular media 
portrayals to Supreme Court precedent, trials are presumptively open 
affairs.2 
The great majority of civil cases, however, never make it to that stage.3 
As one district court judge explained: “[I]t is no secret that the civil jury 
trial is vanishing.”4 In its place, there has been a movement towards 
settlement and dispositive motions.5 
 
 1 See DANIEL J. LEVITIN, THE ORGANIZED MIND: THINKING STRAIGHT IN THE AGE OF 
INFORMATION OVERLOAD 6 (2014) (explaining how, in 2011, each day, Americans were 
exposed to an amount of information that would fill 175 newspapers); see also John B. 
Horrigan, Information Overload, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/12/07/information-overload/ (finding that 20% of 
Americans are overwhelmed by the amount information they encounter).  
 2 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) 
(“Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by 
this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been 
presumptively open.”); Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and 
Discovery Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2186 (2014) (describing public trial 
scene from Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird). 
 3 See Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to Pretrial 
Information in the Federal Courts 1938-2006, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 818 (2007); Judith 
Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 924, 928 (2000). 
 4 Walker v. Yamaha Motor Co., No. 6:13-CV-1546-Orl-37GJK, 2016 WL 7325518, 
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2016) (discussing empirical studies showing “an ongoing 
escalation in the percentage of civil actions resolved without a jury trial”); see also John 
H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524 
(2012); Xavier Rodriguez, The Decline of Civil Jury Trials: A Positive Development, Myth, 
or the End of Justice As We Now Know It?, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 333, 335-36 (2014). 
 5 See, e.g., Saul Levmorez & Frank Fagan, Semi-Confidential Settlements in Civil, 
Criminal, and Sexual Assault Cases, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 311, 354 (2018) (describing 
why defendants might value confidential settlements); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: 
The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 
124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2842-50 (2015) (discussing the court and judges encouraging 
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The common thread connecting these different means of resolving 
civil cases is that trials, settlement, and dispositive motions all turn on 
information exchanged during discovery.6 But, in discovery — an early 
stage of litigation — the presumption of public transparency is relatively 
weak compared with when the case moves towards trial.7 Adding to the 
opacity, civil litigants regularly agree to prohibit the public disclosure 
of any information obtained in discovery through stipulated protective 
orders.8  
Stipulated protective orders have long been an important part of civil 
litigation and are used in a wide range of cases.9 From this, a rich 
academic literature and case law has developed around confidential 
discovery, exploring the costs and benefits of letting parties obtain court 
orders to keep sensitive material exchanged in litigation secret from the 
public.10 One side of the long-standing debate champions the reduction 
 
parties to settle). See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1083 
(1984) (“The allure of settlement in large part derives from the fact that it avoids the 
need for a trial.”). 
 6 See Richard D. Freer, Exodus from and Transformation of American Civil Litigation, 
65 EMORY L.J. 1491, 1512-13 (2016) (“Part and parcel of the vanishing trial is a focus 
on pretrial practice.”); Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against: (“Settlement” Not 
Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1221 (2009) (stating that “[m]uch of the action in 
modern litigation takes place in discovery . . . .”); Andrew S. Pollis, Busting Up the 
Pretrial Industry, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2097, 2097 (2017) (“What has supplanted the 
trial culture is not settlement alone but rather a culture of pretrial practice.”). 
 7 See Laurie K. Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the 
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999); see also Nixon v. Warner 
Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (“It is clear that the courts of this country 
recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including 
judicial records and documents.”). See generally Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 
U.S. 1, 8-10 (1986) (explaining that historical openness and importance of the role of 
public are key factors for determination). 
 8 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2187. 
 9 See infra Part I.A (describing the history of confidential discovery and protective 
orders); see, e.g., Stipulated Protective Order, A.M. v. Physicians’ Med. Ctr., P.C., No. 
3:17-cv-01833, 2018 WL 6305661 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 2018) (entering stipulated protective 
order in sexual abuse case); [Proposed] Stipulated Protective Order, Election Sys. & 
Software, LLC v. Dominion Voting Sys., Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01172 (D. Del. filed Jan. 22, 
2018) (entering stipulated protective order in patent case). 
 10 Compare Benham, supra note 2, Doré, supra note 7, and Craig Smith et al., Finding 
a Balance Between Securing Confidentiality and Preserving Court Transparency: A Re-Visit 
of Rule 76a and its Application to Unfiled Discovery, 69 SMU L. REV. 309 (2016), with 
Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457 
(1991) [hereinafter Discovery Controversy] and Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, 
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991). 
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of barriers to production.11 When a court issues a protective order 
preventing the sharing of discovery beyond the parties, a producing 
party is more likely to both share material and forgo expensive 
screening. On the other side, confidential discovery effectively limits 
the public’s ability to access what is happening in the courts.12 And, to 
this, the hidden information may reduce necessary coordination with 
outside experts, socially beneficial private enforcement, and oversight 
over the courts themselves. 
Whether stipulated protective orders are viewed as enhancing 
litigation efficiency by protecting parties’ confidential information or as 
barriers to socially beneficial information-sharing about misconduct, 
the practical significance is clear. And there is a need for continued 
examination because the growth of electronically stored information 
(“ESI”), increased access to electronic dockets, and the #MeToo 
movement raise new questions about how stipulated protective orders 
may be used, both now and in the future.13 
Moreover, despite the sizeable amount of existing scholarship about 
confidential discovery, scholars have not deeply considered how 
confidential discovery is implemented in practice. Now, with the rise of 
electronically searchable dockets, actual entered stipulated protective 
orders are easy to find.  
Taking advantage of that, this Article is the first paper to map the 
confidential discovery scholarship to both the jurisprudence and 
practice of stipulated protective orders. As to the former, when looking 
across jurisdictions, the formal case law is highly consistent with the 
theory. To the latter, the Article analyzes how federal trial courts dealt 
with 100 proposed stipulated protective orders in January 2018 (the 
“Case Set”). The Case Set provides a snapshot of what happens in 
practice, drawing from forty-four district courts and including twenty-
eight types of cases.14 The survey largely is consistent with the appellate 
jurisprudence and confirms the conventional understanding from the 
literature. But it also reveals that courts are regularly entering orders 
containing provisions which overly favor secrecy in a manner 
inconsistent with the governing jurisprudence and consensus theory. 
To make this more concrete, two major issues appeared in the survey. 
First, the majority of orders relied on generic language to describe the 
need for the protective order, obscuring an outside reader’s ability to 
 
 11 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 466-67; Miller, supra note 
10, at 447. 
 12 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 448. 
 13 See infra Part I.D. 
 14 See infra Appendix, Table 1, for a list of all of the cases in the Case Set. 
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see the particularized need for confidentiality. Second, in fifteen of these 
cases, the entered stipulated protective orders conflated the standard for 
filing under seal with the lesser standard for keeping unfiled discovery 
confidential. This is a major mistake that contravenes both the case law 
and the interests described in the related scholarship, even by the pro-
confidentiality camp.15 Such errors are problematic — even when any 
given stipulated order is unlikely to have a formal precedential effect — 
because common practice may act as persuasive informal authority and 
provide examples that other courts and litigants might adopt.16  
Moreover, the prevalence of mistakes in stipulated protective orders 
underscores how profoundly our adversarial system of litigation relies 
on robust argumentation by the parties to get the law right. Quite 
commonly, when parties agree about an issue, courts do not carefully 
examine the legal questions. But where the parties share an interest — 
here, in secrecy — that may diverge from that of the public, courts 
should not simply rubber-stamp party-proposed orders. 
Part I of the Article first provides background on the confidential 
discovery controversy. It sketches a short history of the governing rules 
and jurisprudence. It then summarizes the consensus view of how 
stipulated protective orders work, along with their costs and benefits. It 
then identifies several contextual factors that make the issue especially 
salient at this moment. Part II details the survey’s findings. Part III 
connects the literature to both the case law and practice of stipulated 
protective orders. Part IV proposes potential interventions to address 
tradeoffs, including the risk of legal mistake.  
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY CONTROVERSY 
A. Short History of Confidential Discovery Rules & Jurisprudence 
1. Significant Procedural Rules Development 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the 
“Rules”), custom held there was no public right of access to the limited 
 
 15 See, e.g., Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307 
(6th Cir. 2016) (“In sealing all these documents and exhibits, the parties and the district 
court plainly conflated the standards for entering a protective order under Rule 26 with 
the vastly more demanding standards for sealing off judicial records from public 
view.”). 
 16 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Horizontal Procedure 29-38 (2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
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discovery available.17 Courts used their equitable powers to enforce 
this.18 And this ability to prevent discovery’s abuse by limiting access to 
the produced materials was not lost when the Rules created a new, 
broader right of discovery.19 
The most direct mechanism to prevent discovery abuse is the 
protective order. When originally adopted in 1938, Rule 30(b) 
authorized courts to issue protective orders that covered only 
depositions.20 Ten years later, this was expanded to cover written 
interrogatories and requests for admission.21 In 1970, the protective 
order provisions were moved to Rule 26(c) and made applicable to all 
forms of discovery.22 At the same time, the description of materials that 
deserved protection was modified to reflect existing law, going from 
“secret processes, developments, or research” to “a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information . . . .”23 
The amended rule explicitly allows a court to affirmatively order the 
discovery sought if it denies a proposed protective order.24 
The Rules, however, have not only created tools to limit public access 
to discovery. For example, Rule 5(d) originally required parties to file 
interrogatory answers, responses to requests for admission, and 
deposition transcripts with the court.25 But, in 1980, Rule 5(d) explicitly 
empowered courts to excuse the filing of discovery.26 Still, some courts 
and commentators viewed Rule 5 as having a strong negative 
 
 17 See Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in Products Liability Litigation: 
Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771, 789 (1990). 
 18 See id. (describing a 1912 case in which a Massachusetts court “barred the press 
and other members of the public from attending a deposition on the grounds that the 
deposition was not part of the formal trial”). 
 19 See generally Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing (at Last) That the 
Federal Rules Do Not Declare That Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 331, 345 (2006) [hereinafter A Modest Proposal] (describing the concerns of 
framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 20 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules — 
and the Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 199 n.58 
and accompanying text (2007). 
 21 See 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 2169 (3d ed. 2002). 
 22 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See Campbell, supra note 17, at 789; Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 833-35 
(describing the history of Rule 5).  
 26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment; Campbell, 
supra note 17, at 789; Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 350. See generally 
Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 838-48 (describing the history of 1980 amendment). 
  
1256 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:1249 
implication favoring public access to discovery.27 Then, in 2000, Rule 
5(d) was modified again, excluding the filing of initial disclosures and 
most discovery responses unless used in the action or the court orders 
filing.28 This undercut arguments that the rule created a general right of 
the public to access discovery.29 
In 2007, Rule 5.2 was adopted.30 This rule requires the redaction of 
several categories of sensitive information, such as social security 
numbers, names of minors, and financial account numbers.31 It also 
permits courts to order the redaction of additional information and to 
limit nonparty’s remote electronic access.32 While, in practical effect, 
Rule 5.2 is another mechanism by which aspects of materials exchanged 
in discovery are kept private, it grew out of a broader push by Congress 
to ensure that digital records did not threaten individuals’ privacy 
interests and was not obviously directed at curbing discovery abuses.33 
2. Confidential Discovery, the Constitution, and Common Law 
By the late 1970s, courts and scholars had begun to consider whether 
the First Amendment’s protections for free speech limited courts’ ability 
to issue protective orders.34 For example, in 1979, the U.S. Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia determined that a protective order 
“constitute[d] direct governmental action limiting speech.”35 The 
circuit court thus applied strict scrutiny to find the district court’s order 
“indisputably deficient.”36 But, just five years later, the Supreme Court 
rejected this view.37 Writing for a unanimous court in Seattle Times v. 
Rhinehart, Justice Powell held that protective orders do not require 
 
 27 See Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 861-64; see, e.g., Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 
594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1978) (“As a general proposition, pretrial discovery must 
take place in the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying the public access 
to the proceedings.”). 
 28 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5 advisory committee’s notes to 2000 amendment; Marcus, A 
Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 351. See generally Moskowitz, supra note 3, at 848-
52 (describing the history of 2000 amendment).  
 29 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 350. 
 30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. 
 31 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a). 
 32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e). 
 33 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment. See also 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 625 F.3d 1182, 
1187 (9th Cir. 2010) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en banc). 
 34 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2193-94. 
 35 In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 36 Id. at 197. 
 37 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 28-29 (1984). 
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heightened scrutiny where litigants relied on the court’s discovery 
process to gain the information whose dissemination was restricted.38 
The question of whether there is a common law right of access to 
discovery, though, was not discussed in The Seattle Times. And, in an 
earlier decision, the Supreme Court had stated: 
It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general 
right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 
including judicial records and documents. In contrast to the 
English practice, . . . American decisions generally do not 
condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in 
the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit.39  
The Supreme Court also provided illustrations of this general right in 
practice, noting that it required access in cases involving “citizen’s 
desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies” and 
“in a newspaper publisher’s intention to publish information 
concerning the operation of government.”40  
Accordingly, an open doctrinal question governing access to 
discovery is the definition of a “judicial document.”41 Some 
jurisprudential lines focus simply on whether the document is filed with 
the court.42 Others examine whether the document plays a role in the 
adjudication process, frequently using the stage of litigation as a proxy 
for that determination.43 
B. Consensus View of How Stipulated Protective Orders Work 
To further anchor the Article’s discussion, this Section describes how 
stipulated protective orders are understood to function, drawing on the 
 
 38 See id. at 32-34. 
 39 Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 59 (1978) (citation omitted). 
 40 Id. at 597-98. 
 41 Id. See generally id. at 597 (“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a 
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 
records and documents.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 782 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“If 
[the document] is not [filed], it is not a ‘judicial record.’”); see also Leucadia, Inc. v. 
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1993) (listing cases in 
which “other courts have also recognized the principle that the filing of a document 
gives rise to a presumptive right of public access”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n 
v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 344-45 (3rd Cir. 1986) (“Once a settlement 
is filed in the district court, it becomes a judicial record, and subject to the access 
accorded such records.”). 
 43 See, e.g., United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995); Anderson v. 
Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986). 
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academic literature and case law to present a picture of general 
practices. 
When a civil action is filed in a federal district court, Rule 26(b)(1) 
permits the parties to engage in discovery, a process wherein parties use 
the court’s subpoena power to demand information from each other.44 
As the Supreme Court has observed, the rules governing these processes 
are “accorded a broad and liberal treatment.”45 Following from the text 
of Rule 26(b) and this interpretative principle, a longstanding 
formulation has been that parties are presumptively entitled to any non-
privileged information relevant to a claim or defense in the case.46 And 
parties are generally free to publicly disclose the information they 
receive in discovery.47 Still, this broad right of access to information is 
not completely untempered by limitations on the scope of discovery and 
its use.48 
The key procedural mechanisms for limiting the use of discovery and 
protecting against its abuse are protective orders, which are commonly 
entered into by stipulation rather than by contested motion.49 Rule 
26(c) empowers a court to issue such an order when it finds “good 
cause” calling for the protection of a party or person from “annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”50 The orders 
 
 44 See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, No. 3:11-cv-170-DGW, 2015 WL 12670381, at *2 
(S.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2015). 
 45 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (discussing this in the context 
of depositions). 
 46 See Miller, supra note 10, at 447. 
 47 See Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002); Harris v. 
Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-84 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 48 See Miller, supra note 10, at 487. 
 49 See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 2 (1983). 
 50 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). While not exclusive, Rule 26(c) describes the following 
eight types of discovery protections: (a) forbidding the disclosure or discovery; (b) 
specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the 
disclosure or discovery; (c) prescribing a discovery method other than the one selected 
by the party seeking discovery; (d) forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting 
the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters; (e) designating the persons who 
may be present while the discovery is conducted; (f) requiring that a deposition be 
sealed and opened only on court order; (g) requiring that a trade secret or other 
confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be 
revealed only in a specified way; and (h) requiring that the parties simultaneously file 
specified documents or information in sealed envelopes, to be opened as the court 
directs. Id. For a discussion on the jurisprudence defining good cause, see infra 
Part III.A.  
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typically function by limiting the audience for material that a party 
designates as confidential.51 
Just as the term implies, stipulated protective orders are proposed by 
the parties.52 This usually occurs at the start of a case, before discovery 
has begun or early in that process, because parties wish to avoid the 
costs associated with intensive screening of documents prior to 
production and motion practice over whether particular documents are 
entitled to confidential treatment.53  
After parties propose a stipulated protective order, the court must 
determine if there is good cause to issue the order.54 Illustrating the 
routine nature of the approval process when the parties are in 
agreement, one district court noted: 
We are unaware of any case in the past half-dozen years of even 
a modicum of complexity where an umbrella protective order 
. . . has not been agreed to by the parties and approved by the 
court.55 
This, however, is not to imply that courts always grant the stipulated 
protective orders proposed by parties. On occasion, courts deny joint 
motions for stipulated protective orders when the proposed orders fail 
to articulate why the requested protection is warranted in contravention 
of local rules or binding case law.56 Courts also may, at their discretion, 
modify proposed orders to manage the pretrial process and account for 
the specific factual circumstances.57 One important example of when 
 
 51 See Doré, supra note 7, at 334. 
 52 See Bond v. Utreras, 585 F.3d 1061, 1067 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Protective orders are 
often entered by stipulation when discovery commences.”); Doré, supra note 7, at 332-33. 
 53 See Doré, supra note 7, at 332. 
 54 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Benham, supra note 2, at 2191-92. 
 55 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. 
Pa. 1981); see also Father M. v. Various Tort Claimants (In re Roman Catholic 
Archbishop), 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While courts generally make a 
finding of good cause before issuing a protective order, a court need not do so where 
. . . the parties stipulate to such an order. When the protective order ‘was a stipulated 
order and no party ha[s] made a “good cause” showing,’ then ‘the burden of proof . . . 
remain[s] with the party seeking protection.’”) (quoting Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
307 F.3d 1206, 1211 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 56 See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Am. Guardian Life Assurance Co., No. 
CIV. A. 95-CV-3997, 1995 WL 653977, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 1995); Horgan v. 
Independence Blue Cross, No. 93-CV-2528, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1145, at *6-7 (E.D. 
Pa. Jan. 24, 1994). 
 57 See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“The unique 
character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude 
to fashion protective orders.”); Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 534 (1st 
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courts intervene is when proposed stipulated protective orders contain 
provisions implicating the rights of absent third parties.58 
Given courts’ broad discretion to craft protective orders and their 
tendency to defer to parties’ agreements, the specific terms of any given 
stipulated protective order can vary widely.59 Still, stipulated protective 
orders commonly include provisions that permit parties to designate 
certain types of discovery materials as confidential.60 These are known 
as “umbrella” stipulated protective orders because they do not require 
document-by-document designations.61 Access to the materials 
designated as confidential is then frequently limited to the court, 
parties, attorneys, and witnesses.62 When third parties, including 
witnesses, may be shown the material, the orders typically require them 
to review the stipulated protective order and agree to its terms.63 
Occasionally, stipulated protective orders go further, restricting access 
to all or some subset of the material to only the attorneys, experts, or 
specifically named individuals.64  
The initial process for protecting information under a stipulated 
protective order usually permits a party to unilaterally classify material 
as confidential without any consultation with the requesting party.65 
But the orders generally also include a process for the requesting party 
 
Cir. 1993) (“[T]he design of the order is in any event largely within the trial court’s 
discretion.”); Generosity.org v. Generosity Beverages, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-06054-ODW-
KS, 2018 WL 836610 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (modifying an order to correct clerical 
errors and to conform with judge’s individual practices); Pierson v. Indianapolis Power 
& Light Co., 205 F.R.D. 646, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (stating that the order must explicitly 
allow that “any party and any interested member of the public [can] challenge the 
sealing of particular documents”). 
 58 See generally In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 214 F.R.D. 542 (D. Minn. 2003) 
(permitting intervention of third party seeking modification of a stipulated protective 
order). 
 59 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.432 (Stanley Marcus et al. 
eds., 2004) [hereinafter MANUAL]; see also Benham, supra note 2, at 2210; Doré, supra 
note 7, at 334. 
 60 See MANUAL, supra note 59, § 11.432; see also Benham, supra note 2, at 2189-92; 
Doré, supra note 7, at 332-33. 
 61 See MANUAL, supra note 59, § 11.432. Sometimes, though, the term “umbrella 
protective orders” means that neither the parties or the courts review the material before 
designating it as confidential. See Gillard v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. Re-2, 196 F.R.D. 
382, 386 (D. Colo. 2000). In those cases, courts tend to use the term “blanket protective 
orders” to mean those where there is no document-by-document assessment. See id. 
 62 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2190-91; Doré, supra note 7, at 334-35. 
 63 See Doré, supra note 7, at 334-35. 
 64 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2191; Doré, supra note 7, at 334. 
 65 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2192-93; Doré, supra note 7, at 333. 
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to challenge the designation.66 And to reduce the risk of error, some 
orders state that produced material that is inadvertently not designated 
confidential does not forever lose all protection.67  
Additionally, to ensure the continued protection of confidential 
material, some stipulated protective orders require the material to be 
filed under seal if submitted to the court.68 Serving this same end, 
clauses that call for the return or destruction of the produced material 
at the end of the litigation are common.69 
Despite the latitude allowing for significant variation in the terms of 
individual stipulated protective orders, a number of jurisdictions have 
model orders that provide a template for litigants.70 Even in districts 
that do not provide a model order or otherwise discuss the substance of 
stipulated protective orders in their local rules, individual judges may 
have their own model orders.71 The Manual of Complex Litigation 
provides a sample stipulated protective order too.72 
C. Costs and Benefits of Stipulated Protective Orders 
Scholarly and judicial positions on the relative merits of confidential 
discovery73 tend to follow from broader conceptions about the principal 
role of courts.74 For some, courts “exist to resolve disputes that are 
brought to them by litigants, a bedrock principle that finds expression 
in the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the 
 
 66 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2242; Doré, supra note 7, at 333-34. 
 67 See, e.g., Anita Hotchkiss & Diane M. Fleming, Protecting and Enforcing Protective 
Orders: Easier Said Than Done, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 161, 167-68 (2004) (including such a 
provision in the sample order). 
 68 See Benham, supra note 2, at 664; Doré, supra note 7, at 335. These provisions 
often present a potential mistake of law as is discussed in greater detail later. See 
Part III.B. 
 69 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2189; Doré, supra note 7, at 337. 
 70 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2193. A quick survey of district courts’ websites 
found twenty-nine districts with model orders. 
 71 See, e.g., Model Protective Order, Jed S. Rakoff, U.S. District Judge for the 
Southern District of New York, http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/cases/show.php?db= 
judge_info&id=737 [https://perma.cc/4FAF-3THS] (last visited Sep. 24, 2019). 
 72 MANUAL, supra note 59, at § 40.27. 
 73 Because stipulated protective orders are a common form of party-customized 
procedure for keeping discovery confidential, the costs and benefits of stipulated 
protective orders are well explained by the literature and case law addressing 
confidential discovery. See Benham, supra note 2, at 2182. 
 74 See Doré, supra note 7, at 289-90. 
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Constitution.”75 If one views the resolution of the parties’ disputes as 
the primary function of courts, then party-agreed secrecy is likely 
viewed as beneficial because it should protect legitimately private 
information while also promoting the efficient exchange of information 
and an expanded bargaining range for settlement.76 On the other hand, 
if one sees the judiciary as having a significant role in protecting a 
broader public interest then confidential discovery may be cause for 
concern because it can hamper public oversight of courts and the ability 
of third parties to use information uncovered by the litigation.77 While 
this Article does not stake out a position about the ultimate merits of 
these arguments, it recognizes the practical importance of confidential 
discovery and the underlying interests at stake. 
1. Privacy 
Litigation-related materials can implicate privacy rights that are 
entitled to protection such as might be effectuated through a stipulated 
protective order. These privacy rights can be held by a party or even a 
non-party.78 Illustrating the former, in a personal injury suit, a plaintiff 
might be asked intrusive questions about his or her private life.79 And 
the Federal Rules implicitly acknowledge the importance of these 
privacy interests, as seen in Rule 5.2’s requirement that certain personal 
information in court filings be redacted.80 It is generally beyond 
peradventure that the interrelated privacy and property interests in 
trade secrets also merit protection.81 
2. Efficient Exchange of Information 
Another benefit of confidential discovery is that it facilitates the 
efficient exchange of information. As one scholar put it, “a protective 
 
 75 Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 468; see also William M. Landes 
& Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 236 (1979). 
 76 See Doré, supra note 7, at 286; Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 
482 (describing privacy interests); Miller, supra note 10, at 476 (describing privacy 
benefits). 
 77 See Doré, supra note 7, at 289; Fiss, supra note 5, at 1085 (“Adjudication uses 
public resources, and employs not strangers chosen by the parties but public officials 
chosen by a process in which the public participates.”). But see Marcus, Discovery 
Controversy, supra note 10, at 481-84 (critiquing the over-privileging of the public’s 
interest in confidential discovery discussion). 
 78 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 464. 
 79 See id. at 482-83. 
 80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2. 
 81 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 469-70. 
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order addressing discovery confidentiality lubricates the wheels of 
discovery.”82 When parties agree to keep designated discovery 
confidential, the responding party is more likely to produce material for 
which it otherwise might assert a privilege or relevance objection.83 This 
reduces the costs of litigating discovery disputes. Additionally, the 
intensive screening of voluminous material by lawyers to protect against 
inadvertent production of non-material sensitive information 
contributes significantly to the cost of discovery.84  
However, concerns about efficient exchange of information do not 
necessarily solely favor confidential discovery. Discovery sharing can 
enhance the efficiency of the litigation system as a whole by reducing 
redundant efforts by plaintiffs bringing separate suits against the same 
defendant.85 
3. Promotion of Settlement 
Current public policy promotes settlement.86 In the Federal Rules, 
Rule 16 and Rule 26(f) both identify settlement as objectives.87 And a 
similar push is reflected in statutes like the Civil Justice Reform Act and 
numerous Supreme Court decisions.88 
 
 82 Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 357, 359 (2006). 
 83 See id. 
 84 See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, WHERE THE MONEY GOES: 
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 42 
(2012). 
 85 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2199; Doré, supra note 7, at 305; Marcus, Discovery 
Controversy, supra note 10, at 496 (“More generally, however, it seems that the courts 
continue to recognize that access for other plaintiffs should be allowed whether or not 
it is necessary to facilitate the preparation of the case before them because such sharing 
saves the courts and the litigants time and money.”). 
 86 See Doré, supra note 7, at 290; Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating 
Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the 
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1474 (1994) [hereinafter Whose Judgment?] 
(“On the one hand, on almost every occasion, judges and lawyers extol the virtues of 
settlement and the desirability of enabling private accommodations among litigants to 
end disputes without state-authored adjudication.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 87 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (“In any action, the court may order the attorneys 
and any unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such 
purposes as: . . . facilitating settlement.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2) (“In conferring, the 
parties must consider the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the 
possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the case . . . .”); Doré, supra note 7, at 
290-91. 
 88 See Doré, supra note 7, at 291; see, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 5 (1985). 
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When courts are willing to enter orders that approve parties’ 
agreements to keep discovery confidential, this consensual secrecy 
becomes another bargaining chip that may expand the parties’ 
bargaining range.89 As noted above, trade secrets can be valuable and 
producing parties might have a low risk tolerance regarding their 
disclosure.90 Additionally, if a company is concerned about future 
liability in similar cases, it might place a premium on keeping discovery 
confidential in an existing case.91 Confidential discovery may also 
expand the bargaining range of the parties by preventing unwarranted 
reputational damage.92 Allegations based on information exchanged in 
discovery are untested by a judicial fact-finder but still might carry an 
imprimatur of authority.93 
Confidential discovery also permits parties to communicate more 
freely about their interests given the economic interests described 
above.94 Moreover, even if there were no economic interest that could 
increase the bargaining range, shielding sensitive material from public 
disclosure should still encourage greater candor and, ultimately, 
promote settlement. 
4. Public Accountability of Courts 
Opponents of confidential discovery frequently argue that public 
oversight of courts requires access to the materials upon which judicial 
decisions are based.95 This view treats courts as agents of the public, not 
just of the parties seeking a resolution to their dispute.96 It further posits 
that public processes improve the accuracy of court determinations, 
 
 89 See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 
469, 510-11 (1994). 
 90 See Miller, supra note 10, at 469-70 (describing the value of Coca-Cola’s secret 
formula). 
 91 See id. at 436 (noting that “lawyers might seek disclosure to identify potential 
plaintiffs for future suits”). 
 92 See id. at 491-92; Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 
967-68 (2018) (describing reputational costs even when an organization wins the 
litigation). 
 93 See Miller, supra note 10, at 470 (“In some instances, products have had their 
reputations severely damaged by the premature release of untested information, even 
when the courts or further studies later showed that the information was false.”). 
 94 See id. at 484-86. 
 95 See Doré, supra note 7, at 296; see also Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, 
at 337. 
 96 See Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 86, at 1527. 
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educate the public about the law, and model democratic values.97 The 
transparency argument is also linked with press access to discovery or 
other pretrial information because publication by news outlets is the 
main mechanism by which the public stays informed of the judiciary’s 
actions.98  
In response, proponents of confidential discovery question whether 
unlimited public access to discovery might ultimately disrupt the 
courts’ operations.99 If the parties and courts have to continually field 
public requests, they may have to divert resources from arguing or 
deciding the substantive legal issue.100 
5. Enforcement of Substantive Laws 
Another concern with confidential discovery is that protective orders 
may be used to hide information — such as defects in a popular product 
— that would otherwise reveal a public hazard.101 This concern was 
particularly relevant when product liability cases featured prominently 
in litigation, as in the 1980s.102 One example is the Ford/Firestone 
litigation, which stemmed from the death of hundreds of people due to 
poor tire quality and vehicle design. Despite numerous lawsuits, 
information about the defects took almost a decade to come to light.103 
 
 97 See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1835-36 (2014) (“In 
addition to Bentham’s focus on publicity as enhancing accuracy, education, and 
discipline, today’s courts serve another function — as a site of democratic practices.”); 
see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 1657, 1683 (2016) (“At least some measure of transparency is a social good, 
necessary not only for individual well-being but also for the successful functioning of a 
democratic society. Litigation can bring to light vital information that would otherwise 
remain hidden through the process of civil discovery. Litigation can reveal and draw 
attention to social or regulatory problems that might otherwise go unnoticed. It can 
help citizens police the government by forcing governmental entities to release 
information that would otherwise be kept secret and, in so doing, promotes individual 
liberty by placing an additional check on authority.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 98 See Miller, supra note 10, at 435-36. 
 99 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 484-87; Richard L. Marcus, 
Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23-27 (1983) 
[hereinafter Myth and Reality]. 
 100 See Marcus, Myth and Reality, supra note 99, at 27. 
 101 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 458. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See Dustin B. Benham, Dirty Secrets: The First Amendment in Protective-Order 
Litigation, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1785-86 (2014). 
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On the other hand, the number of cases in which confidential 
discovery implicates such interests may be very small.104 Additionally, 
government agencies already regulate product safety.105 
Nonetheless, while the heyday of mass tort actions asserting product 
liability claims might have passed, present-day examples of the danger 
of confidential discovery remain. For example, over the past decade, a 
certain make of Goodyear tires was implicated in dozens of injuries and 
deaths, but there was virtually no public discussion about the product 
because the evidence was shielded from disclosure by protective 
orders.106 Such protective orders often shield the information forever 
because as cases settle, their dockets are closed and the orders are never 
revisited.107 Additionally, protective orders are increasingly sought to 
protect company data about the diversity of employees as a trade secret, 
which might interfere with the enforcement of civil rights laws if it 
allows companies to hide identity group disparities in its practices.108 
D. Changing Contextual Factors for Confidential Discovery 
While the merits of confidential discovery have been debated for 
many years, several new contextual changes suggest a need for 
continued examination of how courts balance its costs and benefits. 
Specifically, the growth of ESI, the increasing public access to electronic 
dockets, and the #MeToo movement each raise new questions about the 
value of confidential discovery. 
 
 104 See Marcus, Discovery Controversy, supra note 10, at 478-84. 
 105 See id. at 1481-82. 
 106 See Ryan Felton, How Goodyear Hid Evidence of ‘The Worst Tire Made in History’ 
Linked to at Least 9 Deaths, JALOPNIK (Jan. 29, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://jalopnik.com/ 
how-goodyear-hid-evidence-of-the-worst-tire-made-in-his-1822200424 [https://perma. 
cc/XKL5-ZG83]. 
 107 See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some 
Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 478 (2006); see 
also Burt Neuborne, Limiting the Right to Buy Silence: A Hearer-Centered Approach, 90 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 411, 423 (2019) (“The truth is that every single day money changes hands 
in an American courthouse in the form of settlement agreements purchasing silence 
about activities that might expose a powerful payor to civil liability or public obloquy.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 108 See Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity As A Trade Secret, 107 GEO. L.J. 1685, 
1689-90 (2019). 
  
2020] Contracting for Confidential Discovery 1267 
1. Growth of Electronically Stored Information 
It is well understood that many rule-based reforms are aimed at 
reducing the error or screening costs associated with voluminous ESI.109 
The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1), which directly embedded a 
proportionality requirement into the definition of the scope of 
discovery, speak to this concern about economic efficiency.110 One 
example of a procedural reform designed to address the costs of 
producing material was the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 502, 
which permits the claw-back of privileged material that was 
inadvertently produced.111 
The sheer quantity of ESI represents a potentially significant 
challenge to standard discovery practice, including the use of stipulated 
protective orders.112 The proliferation of laptops and smart phones 
means people are continually producing tremendous amounts of digital 
data.113 As one judge put it: “The amount of digital information that is 
created every day is staggering, and many companies preserve almost 
everything.”114 
Looking forward, it is estimated that the world will have produced 
forty-four zettabytes of data within the next five years.115 Forty-four 
 
 109 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 52 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1338-39 
(2019) [hereinafter Discovery Hydraulics] (discussing concerns about the costs of ESI 
as a driver of discovery reforms). 
 110 See Seth Katsuya Endo, Technological Opacity & Procedural Injustice, 59 B.C. L. 
REV. 821, 828 (2018); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Electronic Agency and the 
Traditional Paradigms of Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 89 (1992). This, 
however, is not the only possible definition and there are compelling arguments that, 
as a normative matter, social costs and non-monetizable considerations should also play 
a role. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1797-1800 
(2015). Moreover, there is significant debate about whether ESI is presently putting 
significant logistical pressure on litigants or the courts. See Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, 
supra note 109, at 1339. 
 111 See Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal 
Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1672 (2013). Note also that, as was 
discussed above, the substance of Rule 502 is frequently integrated into stipulated 
protective orders. See id. at 1687.  
 112 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 343. 
 113 Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171, 
174 (2006); see also Betsy Barry et al., The Big ESI: Going from Big to Better in E-
Discovery, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 721, 723 (2015) (“Simply put, the information 
artifacts of our personal and professional lives are now mostly digital . . . .”). 
 114 Judge Andrew Jay Peck, A Survey of Emerging Issues in Electronic Discovery: 
Foreword, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014). 
 115 The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the 
Internet of Things, Executive Summary, IDC (Apr. 2014), http://www.emc.com/ 
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zettabytes is equivalent to one trillion gigabytes, and each gigabyte of 
data may correspond to tens of thousands of printed pages.116 
This volume, in turn, may carry significant monetary costs. A 2012 
study found that production costs on a per gigabyte basis averaged 
around $18,000.117 Review costs comprised more than two-thirds of the 
total discovery expenses in more than half of the studied cases.118 
However, when the risk of public disclosure is removed, producing 
parties are less likely to fight the disclosure of information whose 
relevance might be debatable. For example, in one case, two parties 
agreed to a stipulated protective order to resolve a dispute over whether 
deposition transcripts had to be produced.119 The producing party 
explicitly noted that it was not conceding the legal point about 
producing the deposition transcript, but, instead, stated that it merely 
wished to avoid costly litigation.120  
With respect to massive troves of emails containing both responsive 
information and non-material sensitive information that might be of 
gratuitous interest to the general public, and which are easily spread via 
traditional and social media, ESI also raises an issue of kind in addition 
to the issue of volume. Email is now an omnipresent form of workplace 
communication, leading to relaxed standards in which people 
commonly make statements they would not otherwise share in more 
formal settings.121 And, notwithstanding any corporate training, 
individuals frequently mix personal and work emails, creating an 
 
leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-summary.htm [https://perma.cc/TGA7-
RK9R]. 
 116 See Joshua M. Hummel, What’s in the Future for E-Discovery? New Federal Rules 
and Big Data Will Require Consideration in the Face of Continued Uncertainty, LAW PRAC., 
Mar./Apr. 2015, at 52, 56. 
 117 See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE 
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC 
DISCOVERY, at xiv, 20 (2012), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/ 
2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf [https://perma.cc/47B7-5A5R] (finding that 73% of 
e-discovery costs consists of attorneys’ fees for reviewing for relevance, responsiveness, 
and privilege). 
 118 See id. at xv. 
 119 See Stipulated Protective Order at 1-2, Calise v. Brady Sullivan Harris Mill, LLC, 
No. 1:18-cv-00099-WES-PAS (D.R.I. Apr. 30, 2018), ECF No. 21.  
 120 See id. at 2. 
 121 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 343-44; James H.A. Pooley & 
David M. Shaw, Finding Out What’s There: Technical and Legal Aspects of Discovery, 4 
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 57, 63 (1995) (“Employees say things in e-mail messages that 
would never be stated directly to a person or consciously memorialized in a writing.”). 
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additional risk of intrusion.122 One can easily imagine an email chain in 
which a relevant document is forwarded along with a non-relevant, 
sensitive conversation.123 This creates an extra risk that the non-
relevant conversation — which might involve personal details or 
commentary on other business associations — will be used strategically 
against the producing party in the public sphere beyond the contours 
of the particular case.124 
2. Easy Public Access to Dockets 
The introduction of web-accessible electronic dockets in the early 
2000s began a trend, which implicates privacy rights that are part of the 
equation for assessing stipulated protective orders.125 Virtually all 
federal district courts have adopted the Case Management/Electronic 
Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system, which provides electronic access to case 
dockets through the Public Access to Court Electronic Records 
(“PACER”) interface.126 Many courts now require parties to use the 
electronic filing system,127 which fundamentally changes the public’s 
practical access to court documents by reducing the transaction costs of 
 
 122 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 343-44; Mark Huleatt-James & 
Richard Lewis, Managing Electronic Disclosure: Part Two, CROSS BORDER Q., Jan.–Mar. 
2007, at 47-48.  
 123 See CRAIG BALL, RE-BURN OF THE NATIVE (2007), reprinted in NERDY THINGS 
LAWYERS SHOULD KNOW ABOUT ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE (2012) (“Like their counterparts 
on e-mail servers, local container files weave together the user’s responsive and non-
responsive items with privileged and personal messages; consequently, they’re more like 
self-contained communications databases than paper correspondence folders.”). 
 124 See Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation, 2000 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, II.B.4-C.1 (2000). 
 125 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 338; Peter W. Martin, Online 
Access to Court Records — From Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. 
REV. 855, 863 (2008). 
 126 See Local Court CM/ECF Information Links, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/ 
cmecf/ecfinfo.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/CCR5-BDQ5] (only 
the District of the Northern Mariana Islands and District of the Virgin Islands have not 
yet adopted this). 
 127 See, e.g., Peter A. Winn, Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability 
and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307, 318 (2004) (“In 
Section 205 of the E-Government Act of 2002, Congress directed the federal court 
system to implement public access to the Internet by 2004 . . . .”); About CM/ECF, 
TENTH CIR. CT. APPEALS, https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/clerk/cmecf (last visited Dec. 
31, 2019) [https://perma.cc/L4YB-K9BJ] (“ECF became mandatory for all attorney filers 
on June 1, 2009.”). 
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procuring them.128 Moreover, services like Bloomberg Law make 
targeted searching in PACER even easier.129 
The Supreme Court has recognized that remote access to digital 
public records may implicate a different privacy interest than in-person 
access to the same information found in a hard copy.130 The hard-copy 
record is “practically obscure” because the transaction costs of 
physically visiting a courthouse to examine the records is likely high.131 
And, thus, as the Supreme Court stated: 
Plainly there is a vast difference between the public records that 
might be found after a diligent search of courthouse files, 
county archives, and local police stations throughout the 
country and a computerized summary located in a single 
clearinghouse of information.132 
Non-parties have used this relatively cheap access for their own ends. 
For example, credit rating agencies have been heavy users of PACER, 
using the information to confirm bankruptcy filings and determine 
whether individuals are either involved in other monetary lawsuits or 
 
 128 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 337; Nancy S. Marder, From 
“Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding of Public Information, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 444 (2009); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to Secrecy in Litigation, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 317 (2006) [hereinafter Introduction to Secrecy]. Not 
everybody agrees, though, that ECF/PACER has resulted in true public access because 
of the fees it imposes. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schultze, The Price of Ignorance: The 
Constitutional Cost of Fees for Access to Electronic Public Court Records, 106 GEO. L.J. 
1197, 1223 (2018). 
 129 See The Future of Legal Tech is Here, BLOOMBERG LAW, https://pro. 
bloomberglaw.com/ai-analytics/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2019) [https://perma.cc/H5LK-
3DS2]. 
 130 Cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 
749, 771 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The substantial character of that interest 
is affected by the fact that in today’s society the computer can accumulate and store 
information that would otherwise have surely been forgotten long before a person 
attains age 80 . . . .”). 
 131 Marder, Introduction to Secrecy, supra note 128, at 317; see Amanda Conley et al., 
Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court Records: A 
Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 789 (2012) (describing steps in getting 
records from the New Jersey Supreme Court); Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 
19, at 337; Martin, supra note 125, at 865-66 (“Historically, courthouse access to paper 
records had been free in only the most literal sense.”); Winn, supra note 127, at 316 
(“Only those with a relatively strong interest in the information would take time out of 
their day, wait in line at the clerk’s office, fill out the necessary forms, and pay the 
necessary copy charges.”). 
 132 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. at 764. 
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have judgments pending against them.133 This illustrates how the 
system shares important information whose value “flows not from the 
light it casts on the performance of the judicial system or on legal issues 
but rather from what court records reveal about individuals and entities 
engaged in litigation.”134 
Defining these stakes, court records frequently contain sensitive 
personal information, regardless of whether they were deemed 
“confidential” and shielded from the public by protective order.135 For 
example, a study of about fifteen years of cases from the North Carolina 
Supreme Court found that case files “contained an average of 113 
appearances of sensitive information per document.”136 And electronic 
court records contribute to the aggregation problem wherein even 
seemingly innocuous data can ultimately reveal private or sensitive 
information when linked together.137 
3. The #MeToo Movement 
Most of the conversation about whether stipulated protective orders 
harm third parties revolves around product liability suits where there is 
a large potential pool of people with effectively the same claim.138 In 
such cases, the shielded information would likely be of direct use to 
other claimants in future litigation, reducing the need for duplicative 
discovery efforts.139 But this misses the potential psychic and 
instrumental benefits of public dispute resolution processes, which may 
include boosting the morale of victims and protecting them from being 
singled out for retaliation. The practical significance of these benefits 
has come to the fore with the #MeToo movement, a social media 
 
 133 See Martin, supra note 125, at 867-68. 
 134 Id. at 866-67. Moreover, the public cares about keeping sensitive information 
private, even if it is in an otherwise public document, when its use does not serve the 
public interest. See Kirsten Martin & Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy Interests in Public 
Records: An Empirical Investigation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 141 (2017). 
 135 See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical 
Study, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1890-91 (2015). 
 136 Id. at 1857. 
 137 See David S. Ardia, Privacy and Court Records: Online Access and the Loss of 
Practical Obscurity, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1385, 1395-96 (2017); Daniel J. Solove, Access 
and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 
1185 (2002) (“Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not all 
that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait about our 
personalities.”). 
 138 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2200. 
 139 See id. at 2199-2200. 
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phenomenon in which women shared their experiences of sexual 
harassment and abuse.140  
Confidentiality agreements and secret settlements kept hidden 
information about many repeat sexual harassers and abusers. As a 
result, the secret dispute resolution processes have probably led to third 
parties ending up in harm’s way.141 And the silenced plaintiffs might 
also have missed out on the benefits of evidence of repeat behavior.142 
But, beyond this, many individuals described feeling inspired to share 
their stories and bring their claims by the collective outcry and public 
support.143 For example, after several major publications featured 
stories in which women alleged they were sexually abused by Harvey 
Weinstein, a former influential Hollywood executive, “an increased 
number of victims [were] willing to put their names ‘on the record’ 
(whether in the press or on social media), crack[ing] open a floodgate 
of allegations against powerful men across industries, including 
hospitality, journalism, tech, and law.”144 This is a significant example 
of individuals becoming more aware of the critical importance of 
procedure through public dialogue about substantive issues. 
Moreover, this public movement has led to several policy shifts. For 
example, several members of Congress introduced an act that would 
void compulsory arbitration clauses in employment contracts when 
applied to sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims.145 
Additionally, a recent federal statute eliminated an employer’s tax 
deduction for settlement payments and attorneys’ fees where the 
settlement agreement is related to a claim of sexual harassment or abuse 
 
 140 See Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/ 
542979 [https://perma.cc/HH45-GQKL]. 
 141 See Judith Resnik, A2J/A2K: Access to Justice, Access to Knowledge, and Economic 
Inequalities in Open Courts and Arbitrations, 96 N.C. L. REV. 605, 613 (2018) (“The 
outpouring of [#MeToo] stories shows that secrecy has its costs, both for third parties 
who might not have been in harm’s way and for those directly involved.”). 
 142 See id. 
 143 See Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Find Eighty Percent of Women Have 
Experienced Sexual Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018, 7:43 PM), https://www.npr. 
org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-
of-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/VJK2-ND5D]. 
 144 Ann Fromholz & Jeanette Laba, #metoo Challenges Confidentiality and 
Nondisclosure Agreements, L.A. LAW., May 2018, at 12. 
 145 Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act of 2017, S. 2203, 115th 
Cong. § 402(a) (2017); Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, H.R. 4570, 
115th Cong. § 402(a) (2017); David S. Fortney et al., Impact of #metoo on Mandatory 
Arbitration, Nondisclosure Agreements, 15 No. 6 FED. EMP. L. INSIDER 1, 1 (2018). 
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and contains a confidentiality or nondisclosure provision.146 Private 
employers have responded to this pressure too. As of December 2017, 
Microsoft announced that it would void mandatory arbitration clauses 
in its employment contracts.147 
4. Implications of the Changing Context 
As early as 2006, Professor Richard Marcus presciently described both 
how the growth of ESI and the increased access to electronic dockets 
could tilt the balance of the confidential discovery dispute even further 
towards protecting privacy.148 And courts have taken notice of these 
arguments, integrating such concerns into their evaluations when 
deciding whether to issue protective orders.149 While the #MeToo 
movement has not yet been referenced in a discovery order, it seems 
only a matter of time. Still, on balance, the first two factors are likely to 
predominate and suggest that an uptick in stipulated protective orders 
might be seen over time as parties and courts address the increased 
volume of ESI and easily accessible dockets. And, in fact, the number of 
docket mentions of stipulated protective orders goes from 2,142 in 2000 
to 4,115 in 2017, with a high of 7,127 in 2013.150 While the number of 
civil cases also has grown over this period, these figures still represent 
a jump from mentions in 0.8% of cases in 2000 to mentions in 2.3% at 
the high point in 2013.151 
 
 146 See Practical Law The Journal, GC Agenda: March 2018 (Practical Law Article W-
013-3500), THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://1.next.westlaw.com/w-
013-3500?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=cblt1.0& 
__lrTS=20191231233541361. 
 147 See Fortney et al., supra note 145, at 1. 
 148 See Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19 at 337-39. 
 149 See, e.g., In re NHC—Nashville Fire Litig., 293 S.W.3d 547, 571-72, 571 n.22 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing Richard L. Marcus, A Modest Proposal: Recognizing 
(at Last) that the Federal Rules Do Not Declare that Discovery Is Presumptively Public, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 331 (2006), and finding that public access was not warranted). 
 150 The author searched across all federal district court dockets for the term 
“stipulated protective order,” which gave a rough sense of how much they were being 
proposed and the relative frequency over time. The author would guess that there are 
at least two or three mentions per actual order assuming the term shows up in both the 
docket entry for the proposal and the court disposition of the proposal. 
 151 The author compared docket mentions with the total number of pending civil 
cases at the year’s end as provided on the U.S. District Courts website. See Table C-1. 
U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-
Month Period Ending December 31, 2006, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/ 
default/files/statistics_import_dir/C01Dec06.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/UEE8-6GD5]; Table C-1. U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases 
Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 
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The observed increase does not, however, answer whether the 
contextual developments should change how often stipulated protective 
orders are used. While the jurisprudence governing stipulated 
protective orders has largely tracked with the concerns identified in 
both sides of the academic literature, the overarching principle in the 
case law has been deference to individual courts’ weighing of the 
competing factors.152 This is most consistent with the scholars who have 
questioned the general approach of the pro-transparency camp that calls 
for virtually blanket access to discovery, whether filed or not.153 But it 
also highlights that, once the First Amendment arguments are excluded, 
the positions of the two camps in the confidential discovery debate are 
close to each other. The main difference is just in the default posture 
and in which direction the error costs are placed. On that front, as is 
discussed later,154 judges often enter proposed stipulated protective 
orders without engaging in a robust substantive analysis. Such 
casualness suggests, at least, some minimal pro-transparency 
interventions are warranted, particularly as the #MeToo movement 
highlights the potential harms of secrecy. At the same time, there may 
also be an increasing need for confidential discovery given the cost and 
privacy concerns associated with the growth of ESI and easier access to 
electronic dockets. Maintaining a fair balance will be key. 
 
2007, U.S. COURTS,  https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_ 
dir/C01Dec07.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQR5-ZZV2] (last visited Jan. 4, 2020); Table C-
1. U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases Commenced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-
Month Period Ending December 31, 2016, U.S. COURTS,  https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
sites/default/files/data_tables/stfj_c1_1231.2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QPG-KPUB] 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2020); Table C-1. U.S. District Courts — Civil Cases Commenced, 
Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2017, U.S. 
COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-1/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/ 
2017/12/31 [https://perma.cc/5ULX-XLAQ] (last visited Jan. 4, 2020). There were 
274,639 pending cases at the end of 2007 and 338,013 pending cases at the end of 2017, 
which corresponds to a 2.1% compound annual growth rate in total pending cases over 
the ten-year period. 
 152 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (“To be sure, Rule 
26(c) confers broad discretion on the trial court to decide when a protective order is 
appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”). 
 153 See, e.g., Marcus, A Modest Proposal, supra note 19, at 331-32; Miller, supra note 
10, at 429-42. 
 154 See infra Part III.  
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II. CASE SET’S FINDINGS ABOUT HOW STIPULATED PROTECTIVE 
ORDERS OPERATE IN ACTUAL PRACTICE 
Neither the academic literature nor the jurisprudence grapples much 
with the on-the-ground practice of stipulated protective orders beyond 
broadly describing how they function and analyzing court opinions. 
But, as Professor Elizabeth McCuskey noted, when studying legal 
decisions, one must look at both “orders (available only on dockets) 
and opinions (available on dockets and mostly on commercial 
databases) to make holistic observations about outcomes.”155 And, 
given that federal dockets are increasingly easy to access and search, it 
is likely that such orders will start to play a larger role in how society 
understands legal rules and the work of the judiciary.156 Moreover, 
practicing lawyers and litigants care greatly about — and are impacted 
by — these orders and what they suggest about how the law functions 
and how it might evolve.157 
This Article provides a window into what courts are doing in their 
everyday practice by examining a set of 100 orders on proposed 
stipulated protective orders from January 2018. This period was 
selected to provide the most up-to-date set of orders while also allowing 
sufficient time for challenges to arise. This is a cross-sectional snapshot, 
drawing from forty-four district courts and encompassing twenty-eight 
different types of cases.158 
The Case Set comes from PACER, found via Bloomberg Law searches 
for docket entries or documents where the terms “joint” or “stipulated” 
appeared within four words before the terms “protective” or 
“confidential,” which appeared within two words of the term “order.”159 
 
 155 Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Submerged Precedent, 16 NEV. L.J. 515, 522 (2016). 
 156 See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 681, 730 (2007). 
 157 See id. at 730-31. 
 158 See infra Tables 1-3. 
 159 PACER was not designed — and is not optimized — for research. See Michael 
Kagan et al., Invisible Adjudication in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 106 GEO. L.J. 683, 689 
(2018) (describing how PACER is a different tool than Lexis or Westlaw and that 
“[e]ven the case information that is theoretically available is difficult to access”). But 
Bloomberg Law provides an easier way to search through PACER, particularly at a 
national level. See Mary Sheridan Newman et al., Here a Docket, There a Docket: Part II, 
LEGAL INFO. ALERT, vol. 52, no. 5, 2010, at 3-4 (describing how Bloomberg Law provides 
more effective access to PACER). Of course, even Bloomberg Law’s PACER records are 
not always completely accurate. See Mark Giangrande, What’s in Your Toolbox for Using 
PACER for Empirical Research?, LAW LIBR. BLOG (Aug. 4, 2014), https://llb2.com/2014/ 
08/04/whats-in-your-toolbox-for-using-pacer-for-empirical-research/ [https://perma. 
cc/F59R-J3VP] (“Since PACER dockets on Bloomberg are not updated on a real-time 
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The results were then screened for orders entered between January 1, 
2018 and January 31, 2018. 
This Article does not use the data to assert any statistically significant 
finding — that is a project for the future.160 Still, the Case Set likely 
captures a large portion of the stipulated protective orders from the time 
period and does not have any obvious skew.161 For example, of the top 
six districts by average docket mentions from 2007-2017, four districts 
were also in the top six of the Case Set, as measured by the percentage 
of orders the districts account for in the Case Set.162 The fifth district by 
average docket mentions finished with the seventh highest percentage 
of orders in the Case Set.163 
The cases within the Case Set were mostly of types that are likely to 
involve sensitive personal information or trade secrets. Twenty-three 
orders were filed in cases categorized as civil rights claims with eighteen 
of these dealing with employment issues.164 Eighteen orders involved 
copyright, patent, or trademark claims.165 Seventeen orders were filed 
in contract cases.166 A dozen orders were entered in labor cases and 
another twelve were filed in personal injury ones.167 
The Case Set tends to confirm the understanding of stipulated 
protective orders described above. For example, all of the orders 
 
basis, the results were significantly incomplete.”). Still, it should be reasonably accurate 
given that the Case Set is looking back six months. 
 160 During his time as a former strategy consultant, the author has engaged in data 
analyses ranging from, colloquially, “two points defines a line and that is a trend,” to 
using sophisticated statistical software like SPSS and STATA. In consultation with 
experts, a sample size of about 375 would permit drawing statistically significant 
conclusions from the data. While the author did not create a sample that large, the 
results confirm the anecdotal impressions of numerous litigation experts and stand on 
their own as discrete observations. 
 161 There are only about 4,000 mentions of the search terms across all federal dockets 
per year, which would suggest an average of about 330 mentions per month. 
Additionally, one would expect the terms to show up more than once in each docket, 
generally in close proximity, because there should be, at minimum, an entry with its 
proposal and one for its entry or denial. Thus, while this Article does not purport to 
draw any statistical inferences from the data, the 100 dispositions should be a good 
portion of the actual orders from the time period. From discussions with experts, a 
sample size of about 375 would permit the possibility of statistically significant findings. 
 162 The top six districts each had 4% or more of total docket mentions, providing an 
easy cut-off. The seven top district courts in both the case set and overall docket 
mentions are laid out infra Table 4 in the Appendix. 
 163 See infra Appendix, Table 4. 
 164 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
 165 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
 166 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
 167 See infra Appendix, Table 3. 
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provide umbrella protections, permitting the parties to designate 
material “confidential” and shield it from general disclosure. All but one 
of the entered orders call for the return or destruction of the material at 
the conclusion of the litigation.168 And eighty-five of the entered orders 
explicitly continue after the end of the litigation. 
The Case Set also illustrates courts’ tendency to approve proposed 
stipulated protective orders. Out of the 100 proposed orders, only five 
were denied.169 Four were denied because they did not establish good 
cause.170 And two of those four denials also noted that the proposed 
orders conflated the standard for keeping filing under seal with the 
standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential.171 Twelve orders 
modified the proposed stipulations, either correcting a conflation or 
making the specified dispute resolution processes conform to the 
judge’s chamber practices.172 The remaining eighty-three were approved 
without any changes.173  
Figure 1. Court Dispositions of Proposed Stipulated Protective Orders 
 
 
 168 See Stipulated Protective Order at 2, Idrissu v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-13794 
(E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2018), ECF No. 10 (entering order). The order was uncommonly 
short, running just two double-spaced pages. But there was nothing otherwise patently 
outlying about this case alleging a violation of a Michigan civil rights statute related to 
the plaintiff’s pregnancy and subsequent non-promotion at the defendant company. 
 169 Infra Figures 1-2. Note, too, that, after the initial count but before publication, 
revised stipulated protective orders were approved in all five of these cases after counsel 
addressed the concerns of the respective courts. This means that, in the set of 100 
orders, there was (at least) one or more case(s) involving a movie star/professional 
wrestler than there were cases in which the parties did not ultimately get to have a 
confidentiality order. 
 170 See infra Figure 2. 
 171 See infra Figure 2. 
 172 See infra Figure 1; infra Figure 3. 
 173 See infra Figure 1. 
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Figure 2. Reasons for Denials (by Case) 
 
Figure 3. Modifications to Proposed Orders (by Case) 
 
Further conforming to expectations from the literature, the stipulated 
protective orders were entered relatively early in the cases. The average 
length of time between the initial filing of the case and the entry of the 
protective order was 113 days. The quickest was just eleven days.174 The 
longest was 434 days.175 
Overall, the Case Set is mostly solicitous of third-party interests. 
Eighty-six of the entered stipulated protective orders include 
protections for third parties. But this came at a cost: seventy-six of the 
entered orders required third parties to acknowledge that they were 
 
 174 See Confidentiality Stipulation and Protective Order at 15, Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. 
LP v. GSO Capital Partners L.P., No. 1:18-cv-00232 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 
52 (entering stipulated protective order in securities case filed on January 11, 2018). 
 175 See Order Granting Joint Motion for Entry of Stipulated Protective Order at 8, 
Declue v. United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co., No. 1:18-cv-00425 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2018), 
ECF No. 48 (entering stipulated protective order in case filed on Nov. 18, 2016). In this 
case, the stipulated protective order was proposed after a good deal of case activity, 
including the filing of motions to dismiss, amended complaints, and motions to stay.  
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shown, and agree to be bound by, the stipulated protective order before 
protected materials can be shown to them. On the other hand, one of 
the proposed orders was denied for including this same provision.176 
Ultimately, in none of the cases did the docket reflect that any entity 
actually intervened to either assert a confidentiality claim or challenge 
a confidentiality designation between January and August 2019. 
The Case Set did not, however, confirm all of the general practices 
described above. For example, forty-five of the ninety-five granted 
orders include “highly confidential” (or similar) protections that 
restrict access to the attorneys in the case, technical experts, or a very 
small subset of the parties.177 That said, it is not clear the designation 
was actually used in every case where the order contains that type of 
provision. To this point, in only twenty-one cases did parties file any 
material under seal at all. And, of these, four of the six patent cases 
involved sealed filings, which might warrant that sort of more restrictive 
access. 
The Case Set also offers some new insights. For example, it 
demonstrates that practice can be imperfect.178 Implicitly 
acknowledging the fallibility of lawyers, seventy-eight entered orders 
explicitly state that inadvertent failures to designate material as 
confidential or inadvertent production of privileged materials would 
not constitute waivers. Additionally, as will be discussed in further 
detail later, more than half of the entered orders failed to include a 
particularized showing of need.179 And fifteen entered orders 
themselves contained a mistake of law in which the standard for filing 
 
 176 Order at 1, Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 
4, 2018), ECF No. 38 (denying proposed stipulated protective order in a disability 
employment case). The subsequently approved version removed the last sentence from 
the following provision: 
(7) Others by Consent. Other persons only by written consent of the 
producing party or upon order of the Court and on such conditions as may be 
agreed or ordered. All such persons shall execute the certification contained 
in Attachment A, Acknowledgment of Understanding and Agreement to Be 
Bound. 
 177 A few types of cases seemed to include these provisions. All but one (i.e., twenty-
two of twenty-three) of the copyright, patent, personal injury-health 
care/pharmaceutical personal injury/product liability, personal property, other fraud, 
and trademark cases included this provision. Only one other category of case type 
(“other statutory actions,” with three of five) had more entered stipulated protective 
orders that included such a provision than not. 
 178 While this itself might not be a terribly new insight, the particular instantiations 
of lawyer imperfection have not been widely discussed before. 
 179 See infra Figure 4 and Part III.B. 
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material under seal was conflated with the lower standard for keeping 
unfiled discovery confidential.180 
The Case Set suggests that stipulated protective orders typically are 
bilateral. Only eleven orders used definitions that explicitly restrict 
confidentiality designations to only one party. In these instances, the 
definitions related to clear party-specific concerns. For example, one 
case involved the sexual abuse of a minor and her personal information 
was shielded by the stipulated protective order.181 Another case 
involved personnel records of absent third parties who were employees 
of a company being sued for work-related discrimination.182 
 
 180 See Stipulated Protective Order, FotoNation Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 
2:17-cv-00669 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2018), ECF No. 45; Stipulated Protective Order, 
Harrison v. MetLife Grp., Inc., No. 4:17-cv-00412 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2018), ECF 
No.16; Order on Motion for Protective Order, RPG Receivables Purchase Grp., Inc. v. 
WKW Erbsloeh N. Am., LLC, No. 4:17-cv-01916 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 23, 2018), ECF No. 
16; Proposed Stipulated Protective Order, First Solar, Inc. v. Absolute Process 
Instruments, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-08518 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2018), ECF No. 26; 
Confidentiality Order, Caprate Events, LLC v. Knobloch, No. 1:17-cv-05907 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 18; Stipulated Protective Order, Desai v. Lowe’s, No. 4:17-cv-
02485 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2018), ECF No. 9; Stipulated Protective Order, Richland 
State Bank v Agspring Miss. Region, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-01007 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2018), 
ECF No. 14; Protective Order, Depositors Ins. Co. v. Broan-Nutone, LLC, No. 4:17-cv-
02597 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2018), ECF No. 22; Stipulated Protective Order, Idrissu v. 
Aerotek, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-13794 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 14, 2018), ECF No. 10; Stipulated 
Protective Order, Ruiz v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00326 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018), 
ECF No. 20; Confidentiality and Protective Order, Thompson v. McCullen, No. 3:17-
cv-00255 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2018), ECF No. 13; Protective Order, Alarm.com Inc. v. 
ipDatatel, LLC, No. 4:18-cv-02108 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018), ECF No. 37; Stipulated 
Protective Order, Myatt v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-03102 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 
5, 2018), ECF No. 12; Protective Order, Forum US, Inc. v. Southern Roller LLC, No. 
4:17-cv-03764 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2018), ECF No. 7. 
 181 See Stipulated Protective Order at 2, A. M. v. Yates, No. 3:17-cv-01833 (Jan. 23, 
2018), ECF No. 11 (entering order). 
 182 See Protective Order on Stipulation at 2, Cottone v. Does, No. 1:17-cv-01006 
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018), ECF No. 13 (entering order protecting records of city 
employees who were not parties to the suit). 
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III. MAPPING THE CONFIDENTIAL DISCOVERY THEORY TO THE 
JURISPRUDENCE & PRACTICE OF STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDERS 
A. Confidential Discovery Theory & Stipulated Protective Order 
Jurisprudence 
The case law governing stipulated protective orders primarily relies 
on interpretations of Rule 26(c)’s good cause requirement.183 As 
discussed above, constitutional and common law principles do not play 
a direct significant role in the analysis.184 Instead, a court is given broad 
discretion in its assessment as to whether a proposed stipulated 
protective order meets the good cause standard required by Rule 
26(c).185 However, this discretion is bounded by a jurisprudence that 
calls for balancing several factors, which are largely consistent with the 
competing interests described in the confidential discovery literature.186 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit articulated these 
interests in Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson as follows:  
1) whether disclosure will violate any privacy interests; 
2) whether the information is being sought for a legitimate 
purpose or for an improper purpose; 
3) whether disclosure of the information will cause a party 
embarrassment; 
4) whether confidentiality is being sought over information 
important to public health and safety; 
 
 183 This analysis is generally understood to function similar to statutory 
interpretation. See Scott Dodson, Party Subordinance in Federal Litigation, 83 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2014); see also David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive 
Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 929 (2011). 
But see Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Civil Rules Interpretive Theory, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 2167, 2168 (2017); Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL 
L. REV. 123, 125 (2015).  
 184 See supra Part I.A.2. 
 185 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). 
 186 There appears to be a robust exchange between the judiciary and the academy. 
The scholarship, as it must, discusses the important case law. But the judiciary also has 
taken note of the scholarly debates. For example, a leading case from the Third Circuit 
extensively quoted Professor Miller’s article in its discussion of the relevant factors to 
consider. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quoting Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the 
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991)). 
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5) whether the sharing of information among litigants will 
promote fairness and efficiency; 
6) whether a party benefitting from the order of confidentiality 
is a public entity or official; and 
7) whether the case involves issues important to the public.187 
Here, the parties’ privacy and autonomy interests are prominently 
featured.188 Additionally, courts may account for how a stipulated 
protective order promotes settlement as part of its efficiency analysis.189 
At the same time, the interests of third parties and the public are also 
present in the above-listed Glenmede factors. To this, the general case 
law holds that party agreement alone is not sufficient to demonstrate 
good cause.190 This corresponds to the line of thought in the academic 
literature that assigns some public function to the judiciary and a 
concern about the enforcement of substantive laws.191 
Even prominent voices in favor of confidential discovery 
acknowledge that there are instances in which the public’s interests are 
sufficiently weighty to counsel against the issuance of a stipulated 
protective order, whether it is to ensure the accountability of courts or 
to promote the private enforcement of important substantive laws.192 
Consonantly, the jurisprudence requires that the parties explain, with 
some degree of specificity, how keeping the designated materials 
confidential will shield a party from harm.193 This harm usually takes 
the form of a legitimate privacy interest such as the protection of trade 
secrets or shielding an entity from undue, non-monetizable 
 
 187 Glenmede Tr. Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 188 See id. 
 189 See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 785-89 (cautioning against general consideration of how 
confidentiality promotes settlement but permitting specific showing). 
 190 See Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858-60 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that stipulated protective order was improperly issued). Even where the parties 
stipulate, the court must independently determine whether the requirements of Rule 
26(c) are satisfied, but there is no indication the magistrate judge did so. See, e.g., In re 
Violation of Rule 28(D), 635 F.3d 1352, 1357-58 (Fed. Cir. 2011); San Jose Mercury 
News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court-N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 191 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2188-98. 
 192 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 10, at 498-99. 
 193 Compare Makar-Wellbon v. Sony Elec., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1999) 
(holding that the terms were too general), with Bayer AG & Miles, Inc. v. Barr Lab., 
Inc., 162 F.R.D. 456, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying motion to modify existing order). 
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embarrassment.194 It can also be the need to prevent commercial 
exploitation of the information in ways unrelated to the litigation.195  
The good cause analysis also integrates the common law’s 
presumption of a right of access to public documents196 by how much 
weight is given to the public’s interest based on the stage of litigation.197 
With stipulated protective orders, clauses that only protect unfiled 
confidential discovery require a lesser showing of need than those that 
call for filing material under seal.198 And, with filed discovery, the 
standard to shield information becomes more difficult to meet as one 
goes from materials used to support non-dispositive motions to 
dispositive motions and further to trial.199 Still, even the most 
permissive standard requires that parties show a particularized need for 
the protective order.200 
Towards the more demanding end of the spectrum of good cause, as 
with a motion to seal materials connected to a dispositive motion, the 
parties must demonstrate a compelling need that overcomes a strong 
presumption of public access.201 And “[e]ven if designated as 
confidential under a protective order, discovery materials . . . lose 
confidential status (absent a showing of ‘most compelling’ reasons) if 
introduced at trial or filed in connection with a motion for summary 
judgment.”202 
 
 194 See Glenmede Trust Co. v. Thompson, 56 F.3d 476, 484 (3d Cir. 1995); Pansy, 
23 F.3d at 787; Shelley v. Cty of San Joaquin, No. 2:13-CV-0266 MCE DAD, 2015 WL 
2082370, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2015). 
 195 See, e.g., Damiano v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 485 (D.N.J. 1996). 
 196 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978). 
 197 See Shane Grp., Inc., v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307 (6th 
Cir. 2016). Compare Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 
1312 (11th Cir. 2001) (dispositive vs. non-dispositive), with Constand v. Cosby, 112 F. 
Supp. 3d 308 (E.D. Pa. 2015), vacated, 833 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 198 See Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 
945-46 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 199 See Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 572, 
579, 583 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 200 See, e.g., Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 201 See, e.g., id. 
 202 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.432 (2019), annotated for DAVID F. HERR, 
ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 2019) (listing cases from four 
circuits in support). This, however, is quite muddled in practice. See The Sedona 
Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public Access in 
Civil Cases, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 141, 144 (2007) (noting that both the reported case law 
and the comments received by the Sedona Conference Working Group “demonstrates 
that litigants frequently move to seal docket entries, court filings, or whole proceedings, 
citing standards applicable only in the discovery or non-dispositive context. Likewise, 
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Another element of the jurisprudence that speaks both to the public’s 
interest in overseeing the courts’ decision-making processes and the 
rights of third parties is its treatment of third-party intervention. While 
the general requirement that third-party intervention in a lawsuit be 
timely is a feature of the case law dealing with stipulated protective 
orders, the definition of “timely” is expansive, permitting third parties 
to challenge such orders even after the lawsuit has concluded.203 Most 
commonly, media entities seek to intervene in mass tort cases, 
contributing to the promotion of public health and safety by publicizing 
information that leads to additional regulation or private suits to 
enforce the substantive law.204  
Although it is rare, as part of their good cause evaluation, some courts 
also decline to enter stipulated protective orders that purport to bind 
third parties or limit their rights.205 For example, a district court 
rejected a proposed stipulated protective order that included a provision 
limiting the grounds that non-parties could rely on to challenge the 
parties’ designations.206 The same court also advised the parties that 
their agreement could not limit any potential waiver, as to third parties, 
 
judges across the country are routinely presented with stipulated discovery protective 
orders that the parties claim govern filings on the merits. Under the pressure of court 
workloads, some judges may be tempted to improperly forgo the individual 
determinations necessary to seal court documents, and instead issue orders in 
accordance with the parties’ stipulations.”). 
 203 See, e.g., Blum v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc., 712 F.3d 1349, 1353 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“However, motions to intervene for the purpose of seeking 
modification of a protective order in long-concluded litigation are not untimely.”); 
Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1994); Leucadia, 998 
F.2d at 161 n.5 (“[A] district court may properly consider a motion to intervene 
permissively for the limited purpose of modifying a protective order even after the 
underlying dispute between the parties has long been settled.”); United Nuclear Corp. 
v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1990) (“We find nothing improper 
in allowing intervention to challenge a protective order still in effect, regardless of the 
status of the underlying suit.”); Pub. Citizen v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 786 
(1st Cir. 1988) (“Because Public Citizen sought to litigate only the issue of the 
protective order, and not to reopen the merits, we find that its delayed intervention 
caused little prejudice to the existing parties in this case.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2001); Pierson v. 
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 205 F.R.D. 646, 647 (S.D. Ind. 2002) (“[T]he 
protective order explicitly allows any party and any interested member of the public to 
challenge the sealing of particular documents.”); Van Etten v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 1375 (S.D. Ga. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 263 F.3d 1304 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 205 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Guide Corp., 206 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (S.D. Ind. 
2001); Nestor v. Posner-Gerstenhaber, 857 So. 2d 953, 955 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 
2003). 
 206 See Hartford Fire Ins., 206 F.R.D. at 250-51. 
  
2020] Contracting for Confidential Discovery 1285 
resulting in inadvertent disclosures.207 Likewise, courts have noted that 
stipulated protective orders cannot prevent parties in other cases from 
pursuing those materials covered by such orders.208 
An exhaustive search found no instances in which a court rejected a 
proposed stipulated protective order for being too one-sided.209 
Nevertheless, this additional theoretical limitation can be gleaned both 
from courts’ dicta and from the broader (non-stipulated) protective 
order jurisprudence. Courts frequently caution parties that they cannot 
shift the burden to the party challenging a confidentiality 
designation.210 Courts even differ as to whether parties can agree to 
provisions that require the party challenging a confidentiality 
designation to file a motion with the court or whether the designating 
party must affirmatively file a motion to protect the specific material 
once the designation has been questioned.211 Further illustrating the 
concern with one-sided agreements, in a recent federal case, a party 
proposed a modification to the protective order that would only permit 
its executives to access the opposing party’s “Highly Confidential” 
material without providing reciprocal access.212 The district court 
rejected the proposed modification because there was no reason that the 
provision should only favor one party.213 
 
 207 See id. 
 208 See, e.g., Nestor, 857 So. 2d at 955. 
 209 While there were no instances in which a court rejected a proposed stipulated 
protective order for being too one-sided, there are several instances in which courts 
rejected arbitration agreements for creating discovery processes that were too unfair to 
one side. See Colter L. Paulson, Evaluating Contracts for Customized Litigation by the 
Norms Underlying Civil Procedure, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 471, 513-14 (2013) (discussing 
concepts and citing case examples). 
 210 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122 (3d Cir. 1986). But 
see, e.g., Cranmer v. Colo. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:14-CV-645-MMD-VCF, 2014 WL 
6611313, at *3-4 (D. Nev. Nov. 20, 2014). 
 211 Compare Stipulated Protective Order at 6, In re Chase Bank USA, N.A. “Check 
Loan” Contract Litig., No. 3:09-md-02032-MMC (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2009), ECF No. 
48 (entering proposed stipulated protective order with provision requiring challenging 
party to file), and Trusz v. UBS Realty Inv’rs LLC, No. 3:09 CV 268(JBA), 2010 WL 
3583064, at *8-9 (D. Conn. Sept. 7, 2010) (discussing challenge when producing party 
designated 1.8 million documents “confidential”), on reconsideration in part, No. 3:09 
CV 268(DJS), 2011 WL 121651 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2011), and opinion vacated in part on 
reconsideration, No. 3:09 CV 268(DJS), 2011 WL 124504 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2011), with 
Order Re: Joint Statement of Discovery Dispute at 2, Ramirez, v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 
3:12-cv-00632 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012), ECF No. 28 (rejecting proposed stipulated 
protective order with provision requiring challenging party to file).  
 212 See Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., No. 2:10-CV-00106-LRH-PAL, 2015 WL 
3721687, at *2 (D. Nev. June 12, 2015). 
 213 See id. 
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B. Confidential Discovery Theory & Stipulated Protective Order 
Practice 
As shown above, the case law governing stipulated protective orders 
broadly tracks the scholarship on confidential discovery. But actual 
court practices in entering stipulated protective orders present a more 
complicated picture. 
Despite the rationales identified in the scholarship and the case law 
requiring a true independent examination by the courts as to whether 
the parties would suffer a specific harm from public disclosure,214 the 
reality of what courts are doing suggests that party agreement itself may 
be sufficient for many courts to enter proposed stipulated protective 
orders. In the Case Set, just four orders were denied because the parties 
failed to establish good cause by articulating a particularized need for 
protection.215 But the ninety-five approved orders do not suggest that 
parties were truly diligent in showing the specific harm that is the crux 
of a good cause finding. Rather, in the approved group, only thirty-two 
orders described specific types of information to be protected or harms 
that would follow from public disclosure.216 Almost twice as many 
entered orders only included generic language, such as a recitation of 
the list of confidential information from Rule 26(c)(1)(g) or definitions 
drawn from model orders.217 
Figure 4. Good Cause Language in Entered Orders 
 
This general deference to the parties’ agreements, even in the absence 
of a particularized showing of harm, also represents a break with 
 
 214 See Suell v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1191-92 (S.D. Ala. 2014). 
 215 See supra Figure 2. 
 216 See infra Figure 4. 
 217 See infra Figure 4. 
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confidential discovery theory’s concern for third parties whose legal 
rights might be affected.218 When courts enter stipulated protective 
orders that lack such language, they are effectively disregarding the 
interest of third parties — whether individual entities or the broader 
public — in open dispute resolution processes by ignoring the good 
cause requirement of Rule 26(c).219 
Still, the Case Set demonstrates that the stipulated protective order 
practice does not totally ignore third-party interests. Illustrating this, as 
previously noted, eighty-six out of ninety-five approved stipulated 
protective orders included provisions that granted rights to third 
parties. The most common provisions explicitly permitted third parties 
to challenge confidentiality designations or to protect their own 
information. Additionally, when the case was likely to implicate the 
privacy rights of specific third parties as might be seen when the 
personnel information of a defendant-corporation would be material, a 
few orders directly referenced them. One court initially denied a 
proposed stipulated protective order because it required third parties to 
sign a form acknowledging their willingness to be bound by the 
order.220 With that said, third-party information generally is not well 
protected by parties to the litigation.221 
 
 218 See generally Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned 
in Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 808 (2002). 
 219 See, e.g., Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 
2006); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir. 1994); Welle v. 
Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 3:12-cv-3016 EMC (KAW), 2013 WL 6055369, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013) (“Now, although Provident identifies the information 
at issue as proprietary and confidential, it does not provide reasons beyond the 
boilerplate references to competitive disadvantage if the information were publicly 
available.”); BCI Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154, 160 
(N.D. Ala. 1986) (“Moreover, the particular facts alleged by defendants in their present 
motion as constituting good cause for the broad protective order sought do not impress 
the Court as being anything more than ordinary garden variety or boilerplate ‘good 
cause’ facts which will exist in most civil litigation.”). This, however, seems more 
honored in the breach when it comes to unfiled discovery or discovery filed in support 
of a non-dispositive motion. See Erichson, supra note 82, at 359, passim (explaining 
why a light showing of need should be sufficient to support a finding of good cause 
when a protective order is uncontested). See generally Reid K. Weisbord & David 
Horton, Boilerplate and Default Rules in Wills Law: An Empirical Analysis, 103 IOWA L. 
REV. 663 (2018) (discussing benefits and problems with boilerplate).  
 220 See Order at 1, Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. 
Jan. 4, 2018), ECF No. 38 (denying proposed stipulated protective order in a disability 
employment case). 
 221 See Conley et al., supra note 131, at 781 (“Each and every form filled out by the 
parties, their lawyers, or by related third parties (witnesses, jurors, etc.) potentially 
contains vast amounts of personal data including home or school addresses, places of 
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The Case Set did not include any denials for one-sidedness or unequal 
bargaining power between the parties. Still, this concern may, perhaps, 
be inferred from the bilateral nature of the approved orders.222 All 
ninety-five of the approved orders presented frameworks that were 
facially neutral between the parties, even in the rare instances in which 
the statement of good cause described only one party’s information. 
Confidential discovery theory’s concern for the enforcement of 
substantive laws is complicated in practice, perhaps reflecting the divide 
in the scholarship.223 All ninety-five approved orders included a general 
prohibition on third-party use of the information, which reduces 
parties’ ability to share information with other potential litigants. On 
the other hand, four orders — all of which involved regulated entities 
— explicitly permitted information sharing with regulators. And several 
included provisions which acknowledged that other courts or 
government entities could command the production of material 
designated confidential. 
Probably the most notable finding from the Case Set is a common 
mistake of law in the entered stipulated protective orders wherein the 
standard for filing materials under seal is conflated with that for keeping 
unfiled discovery confidential. Two orders were denied on this basis. 
Seven of the thirteen orders that were modified by the courts were done 
to correct that mistake. These findings are promising and consistent 
with the private procedural ordering theory’s basic premise regarding 
the hierarchy of law that should constrain judicial discretion and trump 
party agreement. But fifteen of the ninety-five approved orders 
contained this mistake. In other words, more than one in seven 
approved stipulated protective orders contained a significant error of 
law that was ultimately imported into the court’s practice by party 
agreement. 
With that said, the conflation error might not be entirely driven by 
the parties.224 Drawing from the findings discussed above, there were 
 
employment, birthdates, and, in many cases, Social Security numbers.”); see also Martin, 
supra note 125, at 884. 
 222 See generally Ramirez-Baker v. Beazer Homes, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1020 
(E.D. Cal. 2008) (rejecting an argument that an arbitration agreement with discovery-
limiting provisions was one-sided because the provisions were bilateral). 
 223 Compare Benham, supra note 2, at 2182, with Marcus, supra note 10, at 496-97. 
 224 See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology 
as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1933-34 (2011); Jonathan S. Masur 
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 643, 666 (2015); 
Diego A. Zambrano, Judicial Mistakes in Discovery, 112 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 217 
(2018), for excellent discussions of legal mistakes. As to this particular context, it 
probably rests with the parties. See, e.g., United States v. Carell, No. 3:09-00445, 2011 
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twenty-five total proposed stipulated protective orders with the 
conflation — a full quarter of the Case Set. But nine of the orders 
entered with the mistake came from jurisdictions with a non-compliant 
model order, making it difficult to fault the parties. Nevertheless, even 
after subtracting those instances, the courts only correctly addressed the 
parties’ conflation — through modification or denial of the proposed 
stipulated protective order — about 63% of the time overall (ten of 
sixteen cases). In more than a third of the instances, the courts simply 
entered the flawed stipulated protective order.  
C. Implications of Comparisons 
1. The Limits of Trans-Substantive Procedure 
Throughout this Article, the conflation of the standard to file 
materials under seal with that for keeping unfiled discovery materials 
confidential has been defined as a mistake of law.225 This is consistent 
with the jurisprudence as it is articulated by the appellate courts and in 
the more formal opinions of district courts that are issued to resolve 
disputes.226 But it is possible that, in part, the on-the-ground practice of 
stipulated protective orders is one place where the courts are carving 
out a special exception for certain types of claims.227 Of the fifteen 
stipulated protective orders that were entered with the conflation, three 
were patent cases. And courts have recognized how certain types of 
cases, such as those involving patent claims, might present a differential 
need for protective orders, stipulated or not.228 While this Article does 
 
WL 1114242, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 24, 2011) (“The parties in cases often draft 
proposed joint Protective Orders that violate the requirements of Procter & 
Gamble and Brown & Williamson, and it appears that many attorneys are unfamiliar 
with the principles set forth in these two cases.”). 
 225 See supra Part III.  
 226 See Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 307 (6th 
Cir. 2016). 
 227 See generally Margaret B. Kwoka, Judicial Rejection of Transsubstantivity: The FOIA 
Example, 15 NEV. L.J. 1493, 1495 (2015) (describing how contemporary civil procedure 
is marked by the “departure from the transsubstantive design of the Federal Rules by 
judicial decisions that create substance-specific procedure operating in their shadow”); 
David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371 (2010) (providing a history of trans-substantive 
procedure and the implications of its theoretical underpinnings). 
 228 See, e.g., E3 Biofuels, LLC v. Biothane Corp., No. 1:12-mc-76, 2013 WL 3778804, 
at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 18, 2013) (“[P]articular cases, such as patent lawsuits, routinely 
require protective orders . . . to protect the interests of the litigants.”); Methode Elecs., 
Inc. v. Delphi Auto. Sys. LLC, No. 09-13078, 2009 WL 3875980, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 
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not make any claims about the general value of trans-substantive 
procedure, it is easy to see how stipulated protective orders might be a 
procedural mechanism that is ripe for substance-specific adaptation.229 
As noted above, two-thirds of the patent cases in the Case Set involved 
sealed filings — a rate that is more than three times the remainder of 
the cases. 
2. Judicial Practice Trends Too Much Towards Secrecy 
A second implication of the prevalence of the common legal errors in 
the Case Set — that is, the standards conflation and the lack of specific 
good cause language — is that courts probably are erring on the 
permissive side when it comes to entering stipulated protective orders. 
Both of those mistakes speak to a casualness about the public’s interest 
in transparency — a vital component of the jurisprudence. As such, 
while judicial discretion is an effective tool for dealing with fact-specific 
questions, here, it is possible that courts are erring too much in favor of 
confidential discovery. The one saving grace is that, as mentioned 
above, only about one in five of the suits in the Case Set actually 
involved the filing of sealed materials. And, as of August 2019, only 
eighteen of the cases are still pending at the trial level (and five of this 
subset have already had material filed under seal), which suggests that 
there will not be a giant uptick. And, given those realities, it is possible 
that courts are simply kicking the can down the road to when they are 
faced with an actual sealed filing. To this, in the Case Set, two courts 
subsequently denied motions to file sealed material and one court 
ordered material unsealed. 
3. Considering the Relative Bargaining Power of the Parties 
One final implication of the regular presence of the conflation mistake 
is the concern that it could migrate from contexts in which the parties 
are likely to be sophisticated actors (as with, for example, patent cases) 
who deliberately — and mutually — selected the non-conforming 
standard for filing materials under seal to suits in which it only benefits 
 
17, 2009) (“Patent litigation often requires parties to disclose confidential information 
to one another . . . . [T]here is danger that one party may use such information to the 
competitive disadvantage of the other. The typical means to mitigate this risk is through 
a protective order . . . .”). 
 229 See generally Paul Stancil, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, 102 IOWA L. 
REV. 1633, 1637 (2017) (arguing that “[t]he time has come for civil procedure to move 
beyond rigid formalism and instead begin focusing on substantive equality.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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a sophisticated producing party to the detriment of an unsophisticated 
requesting party.230 While a mutual misstatement of the law is bad 
enough, the second situation presents problematic fairness concerns.231 
An unsophisticated requesting party who agrees to a stipulated 
protective order without understanding the importance of publicity 
might lose a key negotiating element or the benefits of public 
investigation that might accompany public disclosure of the uncovered 
information.232 Such a circumstance might come about because it is 
hard to educate individuals about the importance of procedure, and 
sophisticated parties may use “cognitive biases and information 
asymmetries to manipulate [individual] perceptions about procedural 
terms.”233 Weaker parties might also be more vulnerable to short-term 
incentives.234 Illustrating this concern, the Elliott-McGowan Productions 
v. Republic Productions, Inc.235 decision is open to criticism because the 
contractual provisions — limiting the inspection of a film distributor’s 
financial records — may have been the product of unequal bargaining 
power between a smaller production company and a larger film 
distributor.236 
The Case Set findings are somewhat suggestive in this regard. 
Although it is difficult to assess the relative bargaining power of the 
parties, there appeared to be a general preference amongst companies 
for more secrecy. There were thirty-two entered stipulated protective 
orders in which the parties were both either individuals or companies. 
In the sole case in which both parties were individuals, the entered 
stipulated protective order did not include the standards conflation. Of 
the thirty-one entered orders involving companies on both sides, eight 
 
 230 See Tal Kastner & Ethan J. Leib, Contract Creep, 107 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1279-80 
(2019) (describing how contract terms and court interpretations can migrate from 
sophisticated-actor contexts to consumer contexts). See generally Marc Galanter, Why 
the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 95, 97 (1974). 
 231 See Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 86, at 1487 (describing the normative 
problems with letting a sophisticated repeat actor strategically maneuver to the 
detriment of a one-shot player in the context of vacatur). 
 232 See Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723, 
732-33 (2011). 
 233 Id. at 762. 
 234 See id. at 764. 
 235 145 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
 236 See, e.g., Federal District Court Upholds Contractual Limitation upon Discovery, 5 
UTAH L. REV. 409, 412 (1957); see also Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)build It, They Will 
Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 579, 608 n.127 (2007). 
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of the orders had the conflation. For the sixty-three entered orders in 
which the parties were mixed, only seven had the conflation error. 
IV. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMATIC PRACTICES 
This Part explores several solutions to address the risk of legal 
mistakes commonly found in court-entered stipulated protective 
orders. It divides proposals into those that may be implemented locally 
by courts, those that require doctrinal interventions, and legislative 
responses. 
A. Local Rules & Tools 
Given that the formal doctrine already addresses common mistakes, 
courts might consider adopting local rules or tools that would help in 
the actual practice of confidential discovery.237 
To this, an early hypothesis was that, if a jurisdiction had a model or 
sample order, it would dictate whether the proposed stipulated 
protective order included the standards conflation.238 Anecdotally, it 
appears likely that the existence of a compliant model order (i.e., one 
that uses the correct legal standard) helps prevent the conflation. Three 
of the granted orders with the standards conflation came from 
jurisdictions with a compliant model.239 Nine of the entered non-
complying orders came from jurisdictions whose model orders also 
contained the mistake.240 
 
 237 Furthermore, a recent Supreme Court decision does not add to any confidence of 
a top-down doctrinal shift that is going to reduce the emphasis placed on parties’ 
agreements. See Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019) 
(holding that “where commercial or financial information is both customarily and 
actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an 
assurance of privacy, the information is ‘confidential’ within the meaning of Exemption 
4 [of the FOIA scheme]”). 
 238 See Maxchief Invs. Ltd. v. Plastic Dev. Grp., LLC, No. 3:16-CV-63, 2017 WL 
710956, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 22, 2017) (noting that “courts in other circuits have 
adopted pre-approved protective orders that parties in patent-infringement suits may 
enter into”). 
 239 See infra Figure 5. 
 240 See infra Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Model Orders and Entered Orders’ Conflation 
 
Although not featured in the figure above, the two proposed orders 
denied, in part, for the standards conflation both came from 
jurisdictions with compliant models. This suggests that district courts 
might be able to prevent mistakes by providing a compliant model 
order.241 This solution, though, might exacerbate the problem of parties 
using overly generic language to describe the need for confidentiality. 
Federal courts also can adopt local rules that promote transparency, 
even if they do not directly address either the conflation or boilerplate 
issues. For example, the District of South Carolina adopted a rule that 
created a strong presumption against secret settlements.242 And while 
such rules might have unintended downsides,243 they should prevent 
parties from conflating the standard for filing under seal with a lesser 
standard for keeping unfiled discovery confidential. 
Courts also might be able to encourage parties to craft better, more 
compliant proposed orders (or, perhaps, reduce the need for them 
 
 241 This, however, might have no helpful effect on the good cause error. Merely 
parroting model order language is unlikely to capture the need for confidentiality 
specific to the parties. See Stroup v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 15-CV-01389-WYD-CBS, 
2016 WL 7176717, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2016) (“A ‘standard’ or ‘model’ protective 
order has no talismanic value and should not substitute for counsels’ own thoughtful 
analysis. Counsel should tailor a stipulated protective order to the specific needs and 
circumstances of the case at hand, rather than reflexively recycling hackneyed forms.”). 
 242 See Local Civ. Rule 5.03(E) (D.S.C.). 
 243 See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and 
Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2006) (explaining how 
“restrictions on secret settlements not only may be ineffective, but in fact may be 
counterproductive” because they might “encourage parties to settle before the claimant 
files suit or to choose arbitration instead of litigation,” reducing the overall amount of 
public information). 
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altogether) through more active management.244 When courts provide 
parties with informal guidance and closely supervise discovery, it can 
encourage significantly greater cooperation.245 
B. Doctrinal Interventions 
1. Require More Explanation in Orders 
Another potential solution would be to require more explanation in 
the entered stipulated protective orders.246 Courts are generally 
expected to justify their decisions with reasoning.247 But, with stipulated 
protective orders, one rarely sees anything more than a general 
invocation of Rule 26’s standard.248 
Having to give reasons promotes deliberation and reinforces the 
legitimacy of courts’ orders. As Professor Martin Shapiro explained, “A 
decisionmaker required to give reasons will be more likely to weigh pros 
and cons carefully before reaching a decision than will a decisionmaker 
able to proceed by simple fiat.”249 This deliberative process is a clear 
antidote to the problem of generic expressions of need that commonly 
appeared in the entered stipulated protective orders. Moreover, a 
skepticism of rote recitals speaks to the Rules Committee’s concerns 
that led to the 2015 amendment to Rule 34, which prevents the use of 
boilerplate objections to discovery requests.250 
Additionally, in taking this time to explain its reasoning, courts 
should be less likely to make the conflation mistake. To put it another 
way, when courts have to explain what they are doing, they are more 
likely to avoid accuracy mistakes — an essential component of their 
 
 244 See, e.g., Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, supra note 109, at 1358. 
 245 See id. at 1350-55. 
 246 See Portia Pedro, Stays, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 869, 915-19 (2018) (explaining 
benefits of reason-giving with procedural questions). 
 247 See id. at 915; see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 
633-34 (1995) (“The conventional picture of legal decisionmaking, with the appellate 
opinion as its archetype and ‘reasoned elaboration’ as its credo, is one in which giving 
reasons is both the norm and the ideal. Results unaccompanied by reasons are typically 
castigated as deficient on precisely those grounds. In law, and often elsewhere, giving 
reasons is seen as a necessary condition of rationality. To characterize a conclusion as 
an ipse dixit — a bare assertion unsupported by reasons — is no compliment.”). 
 248 See supra Figure 5. 
 249 Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 180 
(1992). 
 250 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment; see also 
Endo, Discovery Hydraulics, supra note 109, at 1355-56. 
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legitimacy.251 Illustrating this, in the Case Set, thirty-two of the entered 
orders did not reference any legal authority other than generic 
references to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 or Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502.252 This subset had thirteen orders with the conflation. In 
the remaining sixty-three entered orders, there were only two orders 
with the conflation.253 
Figure 6. References to Legal Authorities in Entered Orders 
 
One possible objection to this proposal is that asking courts to explain 
their reasoning would unduly burden them.254 But the simple act of 
writing should not create a significant opportunity cost for the courts 
given that they already are charged to do this analysis.255 
Another potential objection is that trial courts have broad discretion 
to grant or deny proposed stipulated protective orders.256 And it follows 
 
 251 See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that “conducting a more detailed analysis will tend to improve the accuracy, 
transparency and legitimacy of the proceedings”). See generally Michael T. Morley, 
Note, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 291, 330 (2014) (“People 
reasonably may question the efficacy or legitimacy of courts if they are perceived as 
being indifferent to achieving accuracy and substantive justice . . . .”). 
 252 See infra Figure 6. 
 253 See infra Figure 6. 
 254 See Marcus, supra note 10, at 501. 
 255 See Pedro, supra note 246, at 917 (“If a court is already deciding according to the 
standard, the additional time it takes to explain verbally that thought process should be 
reasonably short and, at least, should not be the dispositive factor for a court 
determining whether to write.”). Additionally, there are other structural ways of 
addressing the court-capacity costs of requiring courts to spend more time providing 
reasons to litigants for their decisions. See generally F. Andrew Hessick, Consenting to 
Adjudication Outside the Article III Courts, 71 VAND. L. REV. 715, 752–53 (2018). 
 256 See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). 
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that any appellate review will be highly deferential to the trial court’s 
decision, reducing the structural demand for explicit discussion of its 
logic.257 Even so, this discretion is not unlimited. Thus, reason-giving 
should help effectuate meaningful appellate review.258 Additionally, the 
case law sets forth the factors that trial courts should consider, 
providing clear instructions and enhancing uniformity of legal 
principle, while still allowing for case-by-case determinations.259 
Finally, legal decisions impact the rights — and lives — of parties.260 
Giving reasons lets parties know that their arguments have been heard 
and understood — a key component of the participation norm.261 And, 
even in a circumstance in which the court is granting the parties’ 
requested relief, such transparency lets outsider observers understand 
the rationale for the decision, adding to the accountability of courts.262 
2. Permit Partial Redactions 
Instead of using stipulated protective orders to reduce the screening 
costs and privacy concerns of the producing parties, an alternative tactic 
frequently employed in practice is the redaction of non-relevant or 
sensitive information from responsive documents.263 But Rule 34 does 
 
 257 See Robin J. Effron, Reason Giving and Rule Making in Procedural Law, 65 ALA. L. 
REV. 683, 704-05 (2014); Pedro, supra note 246, at 927. 
 258 See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 662 (1994). 
 259 See Effron, supra note 257, at 716 (explaining that procedural rules should lay 
out the purposes of the mechanisms and how courts should consider the relevant 
factors). 
 260 See Pedro, supra note 246, at 915. 
 261 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 125-27, 149-63, 175-78 
(1990); Susan A. Fitzgibbon, The Judicial Itch, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 485, 506 (1990) (“The 
arbitral opinion contributes to the therapeutic effect [of] the process and the continuing 
relationship of the parties by explaining the reasoning behind the award, demonstrating 
that the arbitrator heard and considered the arguments of each side.”); Lon L. Fuller, 
The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978) (“Without 
[reasoned] opinions the parties have to take it on faith that their participation in the 
decision has been real, that the arbiter has in fact understood and taken into account 
their proofs and arguments.”). 
 262 See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A 
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 510-11 (2015). 
 263 See York Grp. v. Pontone, No. 2:10-CV-1078-JFC, 2011 WL 13136290, at *3 
(W.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2011) (“Despite the absence of any provision in Rule 34 authorizing 
the redaction of non-responsive information from documents produced in response to 
a request for production, it is not uncommon for such redactions to be made . . . .”); JAY 
E. GRENIG & JEFFREY S. KINSLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL CIVIL DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE 
E-DISCOVERY AND RECORDS § 7:43 (4th ed. 2019); see also Vernon M. Winters, Secrets 
Revealed: Side Effects of High-Stakes Litigation, FED. LAW., July 2001, at 30, 35 
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not explicitly contemplate such redactions.264 And, while courts are 
split on whether it is permissible,265 the prevailing view is that it is 
“generally improper for parties to unilaterally make redactions within 
responsive documents on the grounds that the redacted portions are 
not relevant.”266 Courts have identified strong reasons for the dominant 
trend in the case law, including the possibility of abuse, the importance 
of seeing relevant information in its context, and the risk that even 
proper redactions might engender distrust between the parties.267  
While courts have (for good reasons) generally disfavored the 
redaction of non-relevant, sensitive information in responsive 
documents, it is possible that the growth of email will force a new 
look.268 And Rule 5.2 already articulates a concern for keeping certain 
types of information exchanged in discovery presumptively private 
through redactions.269 While the United States has not gone that far, 
Canada’s legal system permits redactions along such lines.270 
 
(describing the practical costs and benefits of redacting vigorously). Speaking to the 
interchangeability of the tactics, one court, in part, denied a party’s request for 
permission to redact non-relevant information from responsive documents because of 
the existence of a stipulated protective order. See In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended 
Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices, & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 8:10 ML 02151 JVS, 2012 
WL 9337626, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012). In a mirroring circumstance, another 
court granted a party’s request to redact non-relevant information from responsive 
documents, in part, because sensitive information had been exposed to the public in 
violation of an existing protective order. See In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
15-2599-MD-MORENO, 2016 WL 1460143, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 2016). 
 264 See FED. R. CIV. P. 34; see also York Grp., 2011 WL 13136290, at *3. 
 265 See, e.g., In re Toyota Motor Corp., No. 8:10 ML 02151 JVS, 2012 WL 9337626, at 
*1 (“While the Special Masters recognize there is a split of authority regarding 
“relevance” redactions within responsive documents, we feel that the better policy is 
not to allow unilateral redactions based on relevance by the producing party.”). 
 266 Steven Gensler, Rule 34. Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, 
and Tangible Things, or Entering onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes, in 1 FED. 
RULES CIV. PROC., RULES & COMMENT. RULE 34 (Feb. 2019) (citing Christine Asia Co., 
Ltd. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., 327 F.R.D. 52, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)); see also, e.g., 
Jewels v. Casner, No. 12-cv-1895, 2016 WL 2962203, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2016); 
Bartholomew v. Avalon Capital Grp., 278 F.R.D. 441, 451-52 (D. Minn. 2011); David 
v. Alphin, No. 3:07cv11, 2010 WL 1404722, at *7-8 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2010); Steven 
J. Purcell, Document Production in Federal Litigation: Can You Redact for 
Nonresponsiveness?, FED. LAW., Dec. 2012, at 22. 
 267 See, e.g., Burris v. Versa Prods., Inc., Civil No. 07-3938, 2013 WL 608742, at *3 
(D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2013). 
 268 See supra notes 123 and 124 and accompanying text. 
 269 See supra notes 30 and 33 and accompanying text. 
 270 See, e.g., Mfrs. Life Ins. Co. v. Dofasco Inc., [1989] O.J. No. 1456 (Can. Ont. 
H.C.J.) (QL). 
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C. Legislative Solutions 
One way of addressing the conflation and boilerplate mistakes is to 
simply take them off the table by legislative command. One example of 
this arose in the early 1990s, when state legislatures began adopting 
“open records” or “sunshine in litigation” rules.271 Texas was the first 
state to enact a sunshine rule that creates a presumption that court 
records are open to the general public.272 This rule permits the sealing 
of court records — including unfiled discovery that deals with public 
health or safety unless it is a case dealing with trade secrets or other 
intangible property rights — only when a court finds that there is a 
“specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: (1) 
this presumption of openness [and] (2) any probable adverse effect that 
sealing will have upon the general public health or safety.”273 A few 
other states followed suit but most of those reforms have a more limited 
scope and the trend was effectively over before the end of the decade.274 
For more than two decades, similar federal legislation has been 
proposed.275 For example, in 2017, a bill was introduced that would 
amend Chapter 111 of Title 28 of the United States Code, prohibiting 
courts from entering a protective order to prevent the disclosure of 
information relevant to the protection of public health or safety without 
making an independent finding that the benefits of disclosure is 
“outweighed by a specific and substantial interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of the information or records in question; and [] the 
requested order is no broader than necessary to protect the 
confidentiality interest asserted.”276 This bill, however, did not pass.277 
The legislature could entertain more extreme changes too. The 
United States is an outlier with the liberal amount of discovery that is 
part of the litigation system.278 But Congress could reset that balance to 
one that more closely resembles other industrially-advanced countries’ 
 
 271 David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2651-52 (1995) (describing the history of “open records” and “sunshine in litigation” 
rules). 
 272 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76(a). 
 273 Id. 
 274 See Benham, supra note 2, at 2197; Doré, supra note 7, at 314. 
 275 The Sunshine in Litigation Act was first introduced by Senator Herb Kohl in 
1994. S. 1404, 103d Cong. (1994).  
 276 Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2017, H.R. 1053, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 277 See id. 
 278 See Erichson, supra note 82, at 364 (“Even in other common law countries, such 
as the United Kingdom and Canada, U.S.-style discovery is largely unknown . . . .”). 
  
2020] Contracting for Confidential Discovery 1299 
approaches to discovery.279 Additionally, some systems — like Canada’s 
— treat unfiled discovery as presumptively confidential and prohibit its 
use beyond the confines of the instant case.280 Such changes, though, 
would involve a radical reconception of discovery’s role in American 
litigation.  
CONCLUSION 
Confidential discovery continues to be an important issue in 
procedure. And changing contextual changes warrant continued 
reexamination of the balance between efficiency and participation. 
Moreover, the case law governing the primary mechanism for 
effectuating confidential discovery — that is, actual orders of proposed 
stipulated protective orders — nicely integrates the concerns laid out in 
the academic theory. But the on-the-ground working of stipulated 
protective orders shows how courts regularly over-privilege secrecy in 
contravention of both the consensus academic theory and general 
jurisprudence. Still, the most common mistakes — the use of boilerplate 
language to define the particularized need for secrecy and an overly 
permissive standard for filing under seal — may be solved by any 
number of interventions, from model orders to doctrinal evolutions and 
legislative action. 
  
 
 279 See id. at 364-65. 
 280 See D. Martin Low & Lisa Parliament, Protecting Protective Orders: Misuse of U.S. 
Discovery in Canadian Antitrust Litigation, 26 ANTITRUST 38, 39 (2012) (“Under 
Canadian common law, parties are under an implied undertaking to keep all documents 
and information confidential, and to use them exclusively for the purposes of the 
litigation in which discovery was obtained.”). 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. List of All Cases in Case Set with Case Type and Disposition 
Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Fernandez v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
No. 2:17-cv-06104 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
9, 2019) 
Labor - Other 
Litigation [790] 
Granted 
Terrazas v. Wells Fargo Bank NA, 
No. 2:17-cv-04275 (D. Ariz. Dec. 
18, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Gonzales-Byrd v. Cotiviti 
Holdings, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-05275 
(E.D. Pa. May 3, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Denied 
Bulgajewski v. R.T.G. Furniture 
Corp., No. 8:17-cv-02166 (M.D. 
Fla Mar. 2, 2018) 
Consumer 
Credit [480] 
Modified 
Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 
1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 
22, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Disabilities - 
Employment 
[445] 
Denied 
Williams v. United Parcel Serv., 
Inc., No. 2:17-cv-06773 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 14, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Torres v. Lane Bryant, Inc., No. 
2:17-cv-06933 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Vigueras v. Red Robin Int’l, Inc., 
No. 8:17-cv-01422 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 
20, 2019) 
Labor - Other 
Litigation [790] 
Granted 
A Plus Fabric Inc. v. Pac. Sunwear 
of Cal., LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01556 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Copyrights 
[820] 
Granted 
Lang Van, Inc. v. Asia Entm’t, Inc., 
No. 8:17-cv-01481 (C.D. Cal. 
Nov. 20, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Copyrights 
[820] 
Granted 
In-N-Out Burgers v. Smashburger 
IP Holder LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01474 
(C.D. Cal. June 19, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
Microsoft Corp. v. Genesis 
Comput. Sys., Inc., No. 8:17-cv-
01416 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
NexGen HBM, Inc. v. ListReports, 
Inc., No. 2:17-cv-06522 (C.D. Cal. 
Aug. 21, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
Honest Co., Inc. v. Jakks Pac., 
Inc., No. 2:17-cv-08072 (C.D. Cal. 
May 8, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
Epic Brewing Co., LLC v. 
Eddyline Brewing LLC, No. 1:17-
cv-02637 (D. Colo. July 2, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
Election Sys. & Software, LLC v. 
Dominion Voting Sys., Inc., No. 
1:17-cv-01172 (D. Del. July 5, 
2018) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
Percept Techs., Inc. v. Fove, Inc., 
No. 1:17-cv-01119 (D. Del. Mar. 
15, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
In re Epipen (Epinephrine 
Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales 
Practices & Antitrust Litig., No. 
2:17-md-02785 (D. Kan. Sept. 20, 
2019) 
Personal Injury 
- Product 
Liability [365] 
Granted 
Martins v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Grp., No. 
1:17-cv-12360 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 
2019) 
Contract - 
Insurance [110] 
Granted 
Conley v. Nissan Motor 
Acceptance Corp., Inc, No. 2:17-
cv-02785 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2018) 
Consumer 
Credit [480] 
Granted 
Sutton v. PlusFour, Inc., No. 2:17-
cv-02926 (D. Nev. July 11, 2018) 
Consumer 
Credit [480] 
Granted 
A. M. v. Physicians’ Med. Ctr., 
P.C., No. 3:17-cv-01833 (D. Or. 
Mar. 21, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Medical 
Malpractice 
[362] 
Granted 
Evangelista v. Univ. of Phx., No. 
2:17-mc-01184 (D. Utah Mar. 30, 
2018) 
Other Statutory 
Actions [890] 
Granted 
Hulstrunk v. Ultracell Insulation, 
LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00232 (D. Vt. 
Aug. 16, 2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Carter v. Bridenstine, No. 1:17-cv-
01752 (D.D.C. June 21, 2019) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
T. H. v. District of Columbia, No. 
1:17-cv-00196 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Other [440] 
Granted 
TLE Mktg. Corp. v. WBM, LLC, 
No. 3:17-cv-11752 (D.N.J. July 18, 
2019) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
110 Sunport, LLC v. Holiday 
Hosp. Franchising, LLC, No. 1:17-
cv-01097 (D.N.M. Dec. 26, 2018) 
Contract - 
Franchise [196] 
Granted 
Yeboah v. Cty. of Placer, No. 2:17-
cv-02449 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Other [440] 
Granted 
Bergkamp v. WBM LLC, No. 2:17-
cv-02533 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2018) 
Other Statutory 
Actions [890] 
Granted 
Tryan v. Ulthera, Inc., No. 2:17-
cv-02036 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 
2019) 
Personal 
Property - 
Other Fraud 
[370] 
Granted 
Kovacs v. Assocs. in Neurology, 
P.C., No. 2:17-cv-13577 (E.D. 
Mich. Dec. 19, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Disabilities - 
Employment 
[445] 
Granted 
Idrissu v. Aerotek Inc., No. 2:17-
cv-13794 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Other [440] 
Granted 
Ford Motor Co. v. Cena, No. 2:17-
cv-13876 (E.D. Mich. June 20, 
2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
Young v. Walmart Stores E., L.P., 
No. 2:17-cv-13744 (E.D. Mich. 
Nov. 19, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Other [360] 
Granted 
Depositors Ins. Co. v. Broan-
Nutone, LLC, No. 4:17-cv-02597 
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2018) 
Personal 
Property - 
Product 
Liability [385] 
Granted 
Steffenson v. Wal-Mart Stores E., 
L.P., No. 1:17-cv-00306 (E.D. 
Tenn. Sept. 28, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Other [360] 
Granted 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Martin v. Mgmt. & Training 
Corp., No. 2:17-cv-00588 (E.D. 
Tex. May 22, 2018) 
Labor - Fair 
Labor Standards 
Act [710] 
Granted 
Martin v. Mgmt. & Training 
Corp., No. 6:17-cv-00563 (E.D. 
Tex. May 11, 2018) 
Labor - Family 
and Medical 
Leave Act [751] 
Granted 
FotoNation Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. 
Co., Ltd., No. 2:17-cv-00669 (E.D. 
Tex. Dec. 18. 11, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
Attiyah v. Jones Lang Lasalle Ams. 
Inc., No. 1:17-cv-01261 (E.D. Va. 
May 14, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Gradillas Court Reporters, Inc. v. 
Cherry Bekaert, LLP, No. 2:17-cv-
00597 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
Martin v. Navient Sols., LLC, No. 
1:17-cv-05507 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 
2019) 
Consumer 
Credit [480] 
Granted 
Lucian v. Crosstex Int’l, Inc., No. 
2:17-cv-05286 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 
2018) 
Labor - Fair 
Labor Standards 
Act [710] 
Granted 
Caprate Events, LLC v. Knobloch, 
No. 1:17-cv-05907 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 
9, 2019) 
Other Statutory 
Actions [890] 
Granted 
Kaplan v. Regions Bank, No. 8:17-
cv-02701 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 
2019) 
Personal Injury 
- Other [360] 
Granted 
Pa. Prof’l Liab. Joint Underwriting 
Ass’n v. Wolf, No. 1:17-cv-02041 
(M.D. Pa. May 17, 2018) 
Constitutionality 
- State Statutes 
[950] 
Granted 
RPG Receivables Purchase Grp., 
Inc. v. WKW Erbsloeh N. Am., 
LLC, No. 4:17-cv-01916 (N.D. 
Ala. June 24, 2019) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
Foresee Results, Inc. v. Auryc, 
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-06973 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 23, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Copyrights 
[820] 
Granted 
Vasilopoulos v. United Airlines, 
Inc., No. 4:17-cv-05983 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 8, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Briggs v. Matson, No. 3:17-cv-
04973 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Other [440] 
Granted 
Shaikh v. Experian Info. Sols., 
Inc., No. 3:17-cv-06486 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 6, 2018) 
Consumer 
Credit [480] 
Granted 
Roy v. MI Grp., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-
05800 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018) 
Labor - Fair 
Labor Standards 
Act [710] 
Granted 
Vikram v. First Student Mgmt., 
LLC, No. 4:17-cv-04656 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 27, 2019) 
Labor - Fair 
Labor Standards 
Act [710] 
Granted 
Contour IP Holding, LLC v. 
GoPro, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-04738 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
Taylor v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 
1:17-cv-04506 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 
2019) 
Contract - 
Insurance [110] 
Granted 
Cathedral Art Metal Co., Inc. v. 
Divinity Boutique, LLC, No. 1:18-
cv-00141 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
Falasco v. Gucci Am., Inc., No. 
1:17-cv-07081 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 9, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Associated Materials, LLC v CDC 
LaRue Indus., Inc., No. 5:17-cv-
02355 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
Declue v. United Consumer Fin. 
Servs. Co., No. 1:18-cv-00425 
(N.D. Ohio June 8, 2018) 
Other Statutory 
Actions [890] 
Granted 
Cottone v. McCracken, No. 1:17-
cv-01006 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Other [440] 
Granted 
Lorie v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 
0:17-cv-62151 (S.D. Fla. July 268, 
2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Disabilities - 
Employment 
[445] 
Granted 
MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC 
v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 
1:17-cv-23752 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 
2018) 
Contract - 
Medicare Act 
[151] 
Granted 
  
2020] Contracting for Confidential Discovery 1305 
Case Name Case Type Disposition 
JEG & Sons, Inc. v. Commc’ns 
Test Design, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-
23096 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
Sarah S. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 
LLC, No. 1:17-cv-23513 (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 11, 2018) 
Labor - 
Employee 
Retirement 
Income Security 
Act [791] 
Granted 
Sargeant, III v. Maroil Trading 
Inc., No. 9:17-cv-81070 (S.D. Fla. 
June 4, 2018) 
Personal 
Property - 
Other Fraud 
[370] 
Granted 
Audi AG v. USP Motorsports, Inc., 
No. 0:17-cv-62121 (S.D. Fla. June 
29, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Trademark 
[840] 
Granted 
Seneff v. Ind. Univ. Health, Inc., 
No. 1:17-cv-04126 (S.D. Ind. May 
3, 2019) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Harrison v. MetLife Grp., Inc., No. 
4:17-cv-00412 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 3, 
2018) 
Labor - Other 
Litigation [790] 
Granted 
Martin v. Davis, No. 2:17-cv-
00789 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Norris v. Glassdoor, Inc., No. 
2:17717-cv-00791 (S.D. Ohio July 
13, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Hart v. EM SNS LLC, No. 1:17-cv-
00567 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 4, 2018) 
Labor - Fair 
Labor Standards 
Act [710] 
Granted 
Crawford v. ABM Indus. Grp., 
LLC, No. 4:17-cv-02510 (S.D. 
Tex. Oct. 10, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Marshall v. Acad. Ltd., No. 4:17-
cv-03495 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2018) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Thompson v. McCullen, No. 3:17-
cv-00255 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 
2018) 
Labor - Fair 
Labor Standards 
Act [710] 
Granted 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Ruiz v. FCA US LLC, No. 2:17-cv-
00326 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Motor Vehicle 
Product Liab. 
[355] 
Granted 
Alarm.com Inc. v. ipDatatel, LLC, 
No. 4:18-cv-02108 (S.D. Tex. July 
12, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
Forum US, Inc. v. S. Roller, LLC, 
No. 4:17-cv-03764 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
13, 2018) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Manhattan 
Jeep Chrysler Dodge, Inc., No. 
1:17-cv-06415 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 
2019) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
First Solar, Inc. v. Absolute 
Process Instruments, Inc., No. 
1:17-cv-08518 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 
2018) 
Contract - 
Product 
Liability [195] 
Granted 
Lucky Horse Press LLC v. 
Earthbound Trading Co., L.P., No. 
1:17-cv-06295 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 
2018) 
Property Rights 
- Copyrights 
[820] 
Granted 
Solus Alt. Asset Mgmt. LP v. GSO 
Capital Partners L.P., No. 1:18-cv-
00232 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2018) 
Securities/ 
Commodities/ 
Exchanges 
[850] 
Granted 
Myatt v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 
No. 3:17-cv-03102 (W.D. Ark. 
Mar. 21, 2019) 
Personal Injury 
- Product 
Liability [365] 
Granted 
Richland State Bank v. Agspring 
Miss. Region LLC, No. 3:17-cv-
01007 (W.D. La. Apr. 18, 2018) 
Personal 
Property - 
Other Property 
Damage [380] 
Granted 
Woods v. Progressive Ins. Co., No. 
1:17-cv-00281 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 
22, 20188) 
Civil Rights - 
Disabilities - 
Employment 
[445] 
Granted 
Kula v. Blackstone, No. 2:18-cv-
00471 (W.D. Wash. July 3, 2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Verasonics, Inc. v. SuperSonic 
Imagine, S.A., No. 2:17-cv-01764 
(W.D. Wash. May 31, 2019) 
Property Rights 
- Patent [830] 
Granted 
Dengler v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
Local 118, No. 6:17-cv-06582 
(W.D.N.Y. July 31, 2019) 
Civil Rights - 
Employment 
[442] 
Granted 
Olsen v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 
5:17-cv-01792 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 
2018) 
Real Property - 
Tort Product 
Liability [245] 
Modified 
Diamond Coat Epoxy LLC v. B.D. 
Classic Enterprizes, Inc., No. 1:17-
cv-02624 (D. Colo. Sept. 17, 
2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
Baumgardner v. Cannon, No. 
1:17-cv-02727 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 
2019) 
Labor - 
Employee 
Retirement 
Income Security 
Act [791] 
Granted 
Davila v. Vt. Mut. Grp., No. 1:17-
cv-12266 (D. Mass. Jan. 3, 2018) 
Contract - 
Insurance [110] 
Modified 
Green v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
No. 5:18-cv-00131 (E.D. Ky. July 
30, 2019) 
Personal Injury 
- Health Care/ 
Pharmaceutical 
Personal 
Injury/Product 
Liability [367] 
Granted 
Turner v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co., No. 5:18-cv-00078 (E.D. Ky. 
Feb. 13, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Health Care/ 
Pharmaceutical 
Personal 
Injury/Product 
Liability [367] 
Granted 
York v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 
No. 5:18-cv-00079 (E.D. Ky. July 
30, 2019) 
Personal Injury 
- Health Care/ 
Pharmaceutical 
Personal 
Injury/Product 
Liability [367] 
Granted 
Rerisi v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., No. 
8:17-cv-02230 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 
2018) 
Consumer 
Credit [480] 
Modified 
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Case Name Case Type Disposition 
Douglas v. DHI Grp., Inc., No. 
5:17-cv-04887 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 
2018) 
Other Statutory 
Actions [890] 
Modified 
Bailey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 
No. 4:17-cv-05844 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 6, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Other [360] 
Modified 
Desai v. Lowe’s, No. 4:17-cv-
02485 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2018) 
Personal Injury 
- Other [360] 
Granted 
Upper Deck Co. v. Leaf Trading 
Cards, LLC, No. 3:17-cv-02364 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018) 
Contract - 
Other [190] 
Granted 
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Table 2. District Court Distribution of the Case Set 
District Orders 
 
District Orders 
C.D. Cal.  11  D. Ariz.  1 
N.D. Cal.  8 
 
D. Kan.  1 
S.D. Fla.  6 
 
D. Or.  1 
S.D. Tex.  6 
 
D. Utah  1 
E.D. Mich.  4 
 
D. Vt.  1 
S.D.N.Y.  4 
 
D.N.J.  1 
D. Colo.  3 
 
D.N.M.  1 
E.D. Cal.  3 
 
E.D. Mo.  1 
E.D. Ky.  3 
 
E.D. Pa.  1 
E.D. Tex.  3 
 
E.D. Tenn.  1 
E.D.N.Y.  3 
 
M.D. Fla  1 
N.D. Ohio  3 
 
M.D. Pa.  1 
S.D. Ohio  3 
 
N.D. Ala.  1 
D. Del.  2 
 
N.D. Cal. 1 
D. Mass.  2 
 
N.D. Ill.  1 
D. Nev.  2 
 
N.D.N.Y.  1 
D.D.C.  2 
 
S.D. Cal.  1 
E.D. Va.  2 
 
S.D. Ind.  1 
M.D. Fla.  2 
 
S.D. Iowa  1 
N.D. Ga.  2 
 
W.D. Ark.  1 
W.D. Mich.  2 
 
W.D. La.  1 
W.D. Wash.  2 
 
W.D.N.Y.  1 
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Table 3. Case Set — Case Type 
Case Type Number of Cases 
Civil Rights - Employment [442] 14 
Contract - Other [190] 11 
Property Rights - Patent [830] 7 
Property Rights - Trademark [840] 7 
Consumer Credit [480] 6 
Labor - Fair Labor Standards Act [710] 6 
Civil Rights - Other [440] 5 
Other Statutory Actions [890] 5 
Personal Injury - Other [360] 5 
Civil Rights - Disabilities - Employment [445] 4 
Property Rights - Copyrights [820] 4 
Contract - Insurance [110] 3 
Labor - Other Litigation [790] 3 
Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical 
Personal Injury/Product Liability [367] 
3 
Labor - Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act [791] 
2 
Personal Injury - Product Liability [365] 2 
Personal Property - Other Fraud [370] 2 
Constitutionality of State Statutes [950] 1 
Contract - Franchise [196] 1 
Contract - Medicare Act [151] 1 
Contract - Product Liability [195] 1 
Labor - Family and Medical Leave Act [751] 1 
Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice [362] 1 
Personal Injury - Motor Vehicle Product Liab. 
[355] 
1 
Personal Property - Other Property Damage 
[380] 
1 
Personal Property - Product Liability [385] 1 
Real Property - Tort Product Liability [245] 1 
Securities/Commodities/Exchanges [850] 1 
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Table 4. Comparison of Top Seven District Courts by Federal Docket 
Mentions from 2007-2018 and Top Seven District Court Appearances 
in Case Set 
District 
Percentage of Total 
Federal District 
Court Docket 
Mentions 
 District 
Percentage 
of Orders 
in Case Set 
N.D. Cal.  8%  C.D. Cal.  11% 
C.D. Cal.  7% 
 
N.D. Cal.  8% 
S.D.N.Y.  6% 
 
S.D. Fla.  6% 
E.D. Mich.  5% 
 
S.D. Tex.  6% 
D. Colo.  4% 
 
E.D. Mich.  4% 
D. Or.  4% 
 
S.D.N.Y.  4% 
S.D. W.Va.  4% 
 
D. Colo.  3% 
 
 
